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Stepping up investment for the green transformation is one of the key challenges of our time. 
This Evidence Report makes an important contribution to the debate on how this can be 
achieved, focusing on investment for renewable energy in China.  
 
We know that: (a) decarbonisation is essential for the future of human life on our planet,     
(b) shifting to renewable energy is an essential component of decarbonisation, and (c) huge 
investments are needed for a transition to renewable energy. We know less about how to 
bring about this increase in investment. It is therefore important to learn from those cases 
where substantial increases have occurred. This is what this report seeks to do.  
 
China is a particularly interesting case. For the last five years, China has been the world 
number one in investment in renewable energy. Existing explanations tend to concentrate 
either on the enterprise or the state. The enterprise-focused explanations stress the business 
opportunity. Investment occurs because it is expected to be profitable. The state-focused 
explanations stress that the incentives provided by the state make the investment profitable. 
This report suggests that both explanations play a role but are not sufficient. It examines the 
role played by coalitions or alliances between enterprises and business.  
 
The report does this in some detail. It shows that: (a) such alliances played a bigger role than 
generally acknowledged; (b) their importance varied with the sector (wind and solar) and 
over time; and (c) the alliances took different forms in different circumstances, and these 
forms were important for their relative success or failure. They included a range of actors on 
both the state and business side. A focus on state-owned enterprises would fail to capture 
these constellations of actors. Showing such a differentiated picture is important so that 
simplistic or misleading conclusions are avoided.  
 
The big message of the report is that understanding the increases in investment cannot just 
rely on economic or state-centred reasoning. Political economy analysis is essential. By 
focusing on relationships between business and government actors the report recognises 
that the two sides need to interact. Public policymakers and implementers rarely have the 
required sector-specific knowledge for fostering investment. Investors in turn need advance 
knowledge of whether and how government is likely to guide the investment. Judgement of 
the political support of – or opposition to – policies is facilitated by close contact with 
policymakers and implementers. 
 
Neoliberals view this with suspicion. They favour a greater distance between policymakers 
and investors stressing the risks of rent seeking and capture of the policy process by the 
investors. This report does not explicitly engage with this neoliberal view but we have 
discussed it elsewhere (Schmitz, Johnson and Altenburg 2015). We recognise that close 
relationships between public and private actors can be abused but we also stress that the 
risk can be contained through multiple forms of monitoring and counter-pressures. More 
importantly, the biggest risk is that investments in renewables do not occur if we rely on the 
market alone.  
 
Successful close relationships of this form are not about providing business with unfair 
advantages. They are about recognising that businesses do not operate in a vacuum, but in 
specific economic and political contexts which are partly constructed, and which can be 
constructed in ways that are more or less supportive of investment. The coalition approach 
adopted in this report tries to understand how the interactions between public and private 
actors can make a positive difference. 
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Low-carbon coalitions of public and private actors can have a dark side but this report shows 
the bright side. It shows how such alliances contributed to the acceleration of investment in 
renewable energy in China. The report thus makes a major contribution in providing a 
realistic picture of how a remarkable increase in low-carbon investment was achieved.  
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The primary motivation behind this research is the need to accelerate the supply of 
renewable energy because of the important role that it plays in mitigating climate change and 
in fostering sustainable development. 
Understanding past drivers for low-carbon investment can help us identify those for the 
future, and what could accelerate such investment. Investment in renewable energy can be 
modelled as a problem of technical asset allocation or optimisation at the firm or sectoral 
level, but is not entirely explained by this approach – the context in which actors are involved, 
their motivations and the wider systems in which they operate must also be taken into 
account. The interactions between actors may sometimes accelerate investment and 
sometimes prevent it; however, understanding the dynamics of these processes is crucial if 
we are to shape them. This report is part of a two-part study focusing on the wind and solar 
power sectors in China and India, which aims to find and compare drivers for investment in 
renewable energy. This report takes the example of China. 
Globally, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that US$45tn of investments are 
required between 2012 and 2050 to reduce global carbon emissions by 50 per cent, and that 
85 per cent of this investment will need to come from the private sector (IEA 2009). Annually, 
this averages at a little over US$1tn, half of which will fund the replacement of existing 
technologies, largely in developed countries. The remaining US$530bn is for investment in 
new capacity, the bulk of which (US$400bn per annum) will be in developing countries (IEA 
2008). Indeed, during 2012/13, 90 per cent of the growth in energy demand came from 
emerging economies, led by India and China (IEA 2013). A large proportion of the 
investment in renewable energy sources will therefore need to be in these two countries. 
Given the time-crucial nature of the climate question, many have assumed that a binding 
global deal is a necessary precursor to achieving the level of investment needed. This, 
however, remains elusive, and the political class in most countries continues to struggle with 
prioritising climate concerns above wider issues of welfare, development and 
competitiveness. More developed economies continue to press for the inclusion of emerging 
economies from the start, whereas the latter, citing the developed economies’ historical 
responsibility for emissions and their greater capacity for change, make the ethical and 
practical argument that developed nations must take the first and greatest steps. 
However, this deadlock aside, another dynamic of climate action has been suggested that 
offers a more optimistic alternative, which does not rely on a global deal and follows a far 
more bottom-up approach (Rayner 2010). It is clear that renewable energy in many countries 
– both developing and more developed economies (such as the United States) – is now 
attracting significant investment and may continue to grow. As countries invest in becoming 
low-carbon economies, they will have less to lose as global emissions cuts are agreed upon, 
making them more feasible. This process is already unfolding as a multiplicity of pressures 
from international and local regimes spurs modes of climate action (Keohane and Victor 
2010). However, the precise drivers of this transformation are far from straightforward – for 
example, the policy regimes of both India and China do not show clear goals to mitigate 
climate change. The question we pose is: what exactly drives the investment in renewable 
energy? 
For investors to commit large sums of money into projects whose timelines run into decades, 
they will need to be certain of the viability of the low-carbon sector – a certainty, which, as we 
have seen in the case of the European Union (EU), even the most committed governments 
may struggle to provide through policy measures alone. This research suggests that an 
alignment or coalition of interests of the various actors involved is required to keep the 
politico-economic dynamic of policy, policy implementation and investment on track.    
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Hence, an understanding of the full range of actors (federal, state-level, private and civic), 
their motivations and strategies is required. We expect the wind and solar power sectors to 
provide fertile ground for our exploration. 
This China-based research examines ten case studies: four wind power and six solar power. 
They have been selected according to investment data and industrial characteristics. Each 
study covers the period during which investment in renewable technologies was at its peak 
and all are representative of the corporate financing at that time. For each, we reviewed all of 
the available literature (an abundance of papers and reports) and conducted face-to-face 
interviews. Our interviewees ranged from wind turbine and solar photovoltaic (PV) 
manufacturers, to employees of state-owned enterprises and banks, to local and central 
government officials (particularly from the National Development and Reform Commission 
and the Ministry of Commerce), as well as other researchers. While we adapted the 
interviews according to the particular interviewee, we also used a standard questionnaire that 
we gave to different stakeholders. A list of interviews can be found in the Annex. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the political context 
of the wind and solar power sectors in China and gives a historical overview of their 
development; Section 3 describes the financing landscape within which the wind and solar 
industries have been operating; Sections 4 and 5 respectively analyse the wind and solar 
case studies, in particular the drivers behind investment in the industries and the role of 
coalitions and alliances; and Section 6 summarises the key findings of the research. 
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2 China’s wind and power sectors: political 
context and historical overview 
In 2011, China invested US$45bn in renewable energy, of which 68 per cent was in wind and 
13 per cent in solar. China ended 2011 with more renewable power capacity than any other 
nation, with an estimated 282GW; one-quarter of this total (70 GW) was non-hydro (REN21 
2012). This section introduces the context in which the policies affecting the wind and solar 
power sectors are made and gives a brief overview of the development of wind and solar 
power in China. 
2.1 Political context 
China is a unitary state administered by central government (national government) and four 
levels of local government: province (autonomous region and municipality directly 
administered by the central government); city; xiàn (county); and towns or townships.1 Each 
level has a people’s congress and government (Dong 2007). The commitments and roles of 
national and local government in policymaking and industrial development are very different. 
The key actors in the energy policymaking processes at the highest level in China are the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and the State Council. The NPC is the nation’s top 
legislative body with the highest authority. The State Council is the leading administrative unit 
responsible for implementing laws and policies of the national congress. 
Under the State Council there are a number of major institutions implementing China’s 
energy policies. In general, the National Energy Commission (NEC), National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), National Energy Administration (NEA), and State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) are the most significant at the 
central level. 
The NEC is a high-level discussion body or thinktank with ministerial rank, and the highest-
level agency to coordinate the overall energy policies. It is responsible for drafting the energy 
development strategy, considering energy security and development issues, and monitoring 
implementation. 
The NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under the State Council. It studies and 
formulates policies for economic and social development, maintains a balance of economic 
aggregates and guides the overall economic system restructuring. The commission is 
important in the energy industry since it approves major projects and controls the pricing 
bureau (including electricity pricing). 
The NEA’s mandate is to manage the country’s energy industries, draft energy plans and 
policies, negotiate with international energy agencies and approve foreign energy 
investments. 
The SASAC is a special organisation directly under the State Council. It was established as 
the representative of the state to exercise ownership of state-owned enterprises. In terms of 
energy, these enterprises are the two monopoly state-owned grid companies and five state-
owned power generation companies that resulted from the 2002 energy market reform; they 
constitute the current incarnation of the State Power Corporation of China. The two grid 
companies are the State Grid Corporation of China and the China Southern Power Grid. The 
five power generation companies are commonly known as the ‘Big Five’: China Guodian 
                                               
1 In this paper, local government mainly refers to cities and xiàns. 
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Corporation, China Huaneng Group, China Datang Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, 
and China Power Investment Corporation (Tsang and Kolk 2010). 
Provincial governments can implement local pricing policies as the central government 
delegates local power to regional sub-divisions. Development and Reform Commissions at 
the provincial level are the key units responsible for formulating and implementing pricing 
policies for energy. The provincial SASAC is under the authorisation of provincial 
government to manage state-owned assets on behalf of the nation. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
governance arrangements in China’s energy sector. 
Figure 2.1 Governance arrangements in China’s energy sector 
 
Source: Adapted from Tsang and Kolk (2010). 
To ensure that policies and programmes achieve planned goals, the State Council frequently 
restructures its administrative institutions. The Ministry of Energy was dissolved in 1993. 
From 1993 to 2003, the NDRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission were the two 
key policymaking institutions for energy development. In 2003, the latter was dissolved and 
the Bureau of Energy was formed within the NDRC. In 2008, the Bureau of Energy was 
reshuffled to become the National Energy Administration – a vice ministerial-level agency, 
although it found it difficult to carry out its tasks because the management of the energy 
sector was spread between so many agencies. In early 2010, the National Energy 
Commission was established as the highest-level agency to coordinate overall energy 
policies (Liu 2013). 
Central government holds other powers which may indirectly affect energy policy, especially 
as implemented by local government. These powers include the shifting of geographic 
boundaries of localities, firing or reshuffling local officials and reallocating funds to assist 
localities under certain conditions (Cheung 2009). Meanwhile, local governments are 
responsible for economic development and they have the power to make specific decisions 
about the use of land. The local government’s motivation in the development of the local 
economy mostly includes political and economic incentives: personal promotion, rent 
seeking, pressure from upper-level government, and leadership of top officials (Ma Li 2012). 
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2.2 Historical overview: wind power – the policies, 
manufacturers and the market 
The Chinese government has recognised the importance of renewable energy for some time, 
and listed it as one of its important strategies for achieving sustainable development. The 
10th Five-Year Plan on Developing New Energy and the Renewable Energy Industry released 
in 2001 clearly stated that: ‘the development and utilization of new energy and renewable 
energy is one of the key strategic measures to upgrade China’s energy mix, to improve 
environment and to promote sustainable economic and social developments’ (Xinhua Net 
2001). The Renewable Energy Law released in 2005 even identified renewable energy 
development as a ‘national strategy’. In the ‘Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the 
Cultivation and Development of Strategically Important Emerging Industries’ released in 
2010, the new energy industry was listed as one of the seven strategic emerging industries 
receiving key support.2 
China is rich in both wind and solar resources. Starting in 2000, the government initiated a 
series of programmes to increase access to electricity by developing wind and solar power. 
Later, wind was identified as a higher priority because of its economic and technical 
advantages. 
Figure 2.2 Annual and accumulated installed capacity of wind power in 
China 
Note: Installed capacity includes both off-grid and grid-connected plants. 
Source: Based on data from Chinese Wind Energy Association (2013). 
China’s wind power industry began under the guidance of central government. Grid-
connected plants were built from as early as the 1980s. The total installed capacity was 
4.2GW in 1989,3 and reached 62.4GW in 2011 (Figure 2.2). In general, wind power in China 
has gone through four stages: initial demonstration (1986–93), industry incubation       
(1994–2003), large-scale deployment (2004–10) and adjustment (2011–present). The central 
government has played the key role in each phase. 
                                               
2 The seven strategic industries include energy-saving and environmental protection, information technology, biology, advanced 
equipment manufacturing, new energy, new materials and new-energy vehicles. 
3 GW=106kW, MW=103kW. 
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2.2.1 Initial demonstration phase (1986–93) 
The first wind farm was built in Malanwan, Rongcheng city, in Shandong province in May 
1986. The Vestas V15-55/11 wind turbine had been imported with foreign exchange paid 
jointly by Shandong Province Government and the Ministry of Aviation Industry. Overall, this 
phase was characterised by the use of foreign grants and loans to construct small 
demonstration wind farms, and most of the projects were sponsored by foreign governments. 
The turbines were purchased from Denmark, Germany and other countries. The feed-in tariff 
(FIT) for wind generation was the same as that for coal.4 The government mainly supported 
demonstration wind farm construction and research and development (R&D) programmes on 
wind turbines (Li et al. 2007). 
2.2.2 Industry incubation phase (1994–2003) 
During this phase both central and local governments enacted policy incentives to encourage 
the development of the wind industry. The Increasing-Acceleration Project,5 Ride the Wind 
Program,6 National Science and Technology Plan and other projects were introduced to 
promote the first batch of six wind manufacturers for technology importation, digestion and 
absorption (Li, Gao and Wang 2008).7 During this period, a wind turbine manufacturing 
industry was established and a batch of enterprises led by Xinjiang Goldwind created a 
certain production capacity. 
2.2.3 Large-scale deployment phase (2004–10) 
The goal during this period was to facilitate technological progress and industrial 
development through large-scale wind farm construction. From 2003 to 2009, the central 
government implemented six rounds of bids for wind power project concessions with a total 
capacity of 14.05GW. At the end of July 2009, the NDRC enacted the ‘Notice on Improving 
Wind Power Feed-in Tariff Policy’, introducing four categories of FITs. The design of the 
policy followed Germany’s FIT, and the electricity price was based on the tariff of the fifth 
bidding round for wind power project concessions. In 2009 and 2010, newly installed 
capacity was 13.8GW and 18.9GW respectively. 
The rapid development of the wind industry was further helped when local government was 
granted the power to approve energy projects. According to the NDRC’s ‘Requirements on 
the Management of Wind Power Plants’ enacted in 2005, plants with a capacity exceeding 
50 megawatts (MW) had to be approved by the commission itself, but provincial government 
could approve those with a capacity below 50MW. This resulted in the ‘49.5MW 
phenomenon’, i.e. developers favoured projects below 50MW, or they disaggregated large 
projects into several small ones, in order to reduce the length of time that they had to wait for 
approval and reduce the risks of being refused. 
 
                                               
4 A feed-in tariff (FIT) is a policy mechanism designed to accelerate investment in renewable energy technologies. It achieves 
this by offering long-term contracts to renewable energy producers, typically based on the cost of generation of each 
technology. Rather than pay an equal amount for energy, however generated, technologies such as wind power, for instance, 
are awarded a lower per-kilowatt hour (kWh) price, while technologies such as solar photovoltaic (PV) and tidal power are 
offered a higher price, reflecting their current generating costs. 
5 Increasing-Acceleration Project: its full name was Increasing the Investment Strength and Accelerating the Pace of 
Transformation, a project implemented by the former State Economic and Trade Commission in technical reformation between 
1994 and 1996. The project focused on making national industry policies, improving products’ quality, decreasing material 
consumption, expanding exports, and increasing effective supplies of a number of selected enterprises with better conditions. 
6 Ride the Wind Program: introduced by the former State Development Planning Commission in 1996, this programme sought to 
promote the localised manufacture of large wind turbines and large-scale development. It mainly aimed to: (1) introduce 
advanced technologies by joint ventures or cooperation; (2) organise scientific and technological research projects and master 
the development technology of large wind turbine generation systems; and (3) provide special allowances for constructing 
domestic wind turbine demonstration fields and quality inspection systems. 
7 The first six wind manufacturers were enterprises with strong manufacturing capabilities in related industries. 
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China’s wind turbine manufacturing industry made substantial progress during this period. 
Before 2000, domestic brands were almost unknown, with a market share of less than       
ten per cent. By 2009, there were 43 Chinese wind turbine manufacturers and almost 200 
enterprises manufacturing components including blades, gearboxes, generators, control 
systems, converters, spindles, hubs, bearings, and so on. Domestic manufacturers occupied 
87 per cent of the incremental market in 2009 (Li, Shi and Gao 2010).8 
2.2.4 Adjustment phase (2011–present) 
Since 2011, underlying problems with grid connection and renewable generation integration 
have come to light. In terms of grid connection, the total installed capacity of wind power in 
2011 was 62.4GW, while the grid-connected capacity was only 45.05GW, translating into an 
on-grid rate of only 72.2 per cent. The second problem is brownouts. National wind power 
lost more than 10bn kilowatt hours (kWh) in 2011 because of brownouts, and the total 
brownouts ratio was more than 12 per cent (Li Junfeng et al. 2012). As a result of these 
problems, the adjustment of wind power development became a policy priority. The central 
government took back the approval right for wind projects below 50MW and issued a series 
of grid connection standards. The wind power industry is transforming from extensive growth 
to qualitative growth. Wind power projects have been incorporated into integrated national 
planning. 
Figure 2.3 Government policies in different stages of wind power 
development 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013). 
A review of the development of the Chinese wind power industry shows the vital role of 
central government in nurturing both wind turbine manufacturers and also the domestic wind 
power market. The government adopted a strategy of ‘stimulating manufacturing industry 
through the domestic market’ and implemented six rounds of tendering, which resulted in the 
rapid expansion of China’s wind power manufacturing industry. The central government also 
learned from international experience and selected Germany’s FIT model as its starting point 
for designing policy. Local government also played a significant role, however, with its 
                                               
8 The incremental market is the device market created by newly added wind power installations. 
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approval of numerous wind farms with a capacity below 50MW, driven by their desire to 
‘develop the local economy through wind resource’ (Qi Ye 2013: 235–6). 
2.3 Historical overview: solar photovoltaic (PV) power – the 
policies, manufacturers and the market 
China is rich in solar energy; however, the government did not give much support to the 
domestic market for solar generation before 2009. The development of the solar power 
industry in China was largely driven by exports. For a long time the markets, both for the raw 
materials used to make PV cells and for the manufactured cells themselves, existed only 
overseas. 
Compared to the state-dominated wind turbine industry, most solar manufacturing 
enterprises in China are privately owned. China’s first solar cell manufacturer was 
incorporated in 1998, while the first production line of solar cells was put into operation in 
2002, with a capacity of 15MW. However, because of the lack of domestic market demand, 
the solar industry remained small. 
2.3.1 First period of expansion in PV manufacturing (1997–2008) 
Once the Kyoto Protocol,9 signed in 1997, had established targets for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, solar generation became the technology of choice for several European 
countries. Driven by their demand, the Chinese PV industry developed rapidly after 2004, 
when the targets came into force. By 2007, China had become the largest manufacturing 
country of PV cells and output reached 1,088MW (Figure 2.4). 
From 2000, the central government began to increase access to electricity for residents in 
remote areas with PV systems, as well as other sources of renewable energy. It launched 
projects such as Brightness Pilot Project (in 2000) and Township Electrification Program 
(2001–03). These projects initiated the development of a domestic PV manufacturing 
industry. By 2003, new installations of PV in China reached 10MW and the annual output of 
PV cells reached 8MW (Li Junfeng et al. 2007). 
The Township Electrification Programme promoted electricity supply to remote households 
by off-grid micro-hydro, wind and solar power systems in China. Investment in this 
programme totalled 4.7bn yuan (US$568m). Compared to micro-hydro and wind, solar 
technology faces higher costs and, depending on the type of installation, the challenge of 
replacing batteries later on. After this programme ended, the central government stopped its 
support for solar power projects. Most solar power systems built between 2004 and 2008 
were financed by international donors or cooperation project funds. 
2.3.2 Second period of expansion (2009–11) 
China’s PV industry experienced its second rapid expansion period between 2009 and 2011. 
Many countries implemented new energy policies as part of their economic stimulus plans 
following the global economic crisis of 2008, and the global demand for PV technologies 
again soared. A prosperous international market obscured financial risk and PV 
manufacturers were all vying to expand their capacity. Technological development within the 
industry stalled at this time. By the end of 2010 there were between 20 and 30 polysilicon 
enterprises, more than 60 wafer enterprises, more than 60 cell enterprises, and more than 
                                               
9 The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty that extends the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which commits state parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, based on the premise that (a) global warming 
exists and (b) man-made CO2 emissions have caused it. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 
1997, and entered into force on 16 February 2005. There are currently 192 parties to the protocol. 
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330 module enterprises along the production line in China (Li Junfeng 2011). By the end of 
2011, total production capacity was about 40GW, while new global installation was only 
28GW (Fan 2012). 
The Chinese government launched the first 10MW PV concession-bidding project in 2009, 
and the second round of 280MW projects was launched in 2010. In 2011, the central 
government established a FIT for solar generation. New installed domestic capacity reached 
2.2GW, while 83 per cent of products were exported to overseas markets. 
Figure 2.4 China’s PV production, domestic market and European 
markets, 2000–12 
Sources: Authors’ own, based on: 2000–3 output data: Wang, Wang and Zhao (2004); 2004–9 output data: China Renewable 
Energy Society (2010); 2010 output data: SEMI/PVGroup/China Photovoltaic Industry Alliance (CPIA) (2011); 2011 output data: 
Photon International (2011); 2012 output data: SEMI/PVGroup/CPIA (2013); newly increased installation data of domestic 
market and European market 2000–12: European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) (2013). 
2.3.3 Period of depression (2012–present) 
Since Q4 2011, excessive competition in the export market and substantially reduced 
financial subsidies have resulted in a drop in the sale price of exported PV cells and modules 
to below their manufacturing costs. So far, Chinese PV manufacturers’ profits have 
comprehensively fallen. Many have experienced financial difficulties, and even the prospect 
of bankruptcy (Labwu 2012). 
Due to the United States (US) financial crisis and the European debt crisis, more and more 
countries have cut public subsidies for PV power generation, and this has greatly impacted 
the export of China’s PV industry. Moreover, trade protectionism is rising. The US 
Department of Commerce announced a preliminary ruling to impose high anti-dumping 
duties on PV cells and modules imported from China in March 2012. In July 2012, German 
firm SolarWorld filed a complaint with the European Commission, asking for an anti-dumping 
investigation into PV products imported from China. Undoubtedly, the US and EU anti-
dumping and countervailing tariffs were a serious blow for the Chinese PV industry. In 2013, 
the entire industry went into a phase of consolidation, featuring extensive mergers and 
acquisitions. 
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3 Financing landscape 
This section provides an outline of where the investment for wind and solar power in China 
comes from and who the main investors are. This then provides a context for the case 
studies that follow. 
3.1 Investment structure of wind and PV projects 
There have been three main sources of finance for wind and solar projects: self capital 
invested by the developer, bank loans and subsidy from the central government. According 
to the ‘State Council’s Notice on Adjusting the Proportion of Equity in Fixed-assets 
Investment Projects’, the minimum equity for power plant projects is 20 per cent of the total 
investment. As a result, wind and solar energy start-ups could borrow as much as               
80 per cent of their investment. The Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development in China 
2013 shows in its analysis of nine representative developers that generally, wind generation 
projects have been financed with 20 per cent equity and 80 per cent loan (Qi Ye 2013). 
The ratio is slightly different for building-mounted PV projects, where the ‘Golden Sun 
demonstration’ and building integrated PV subsidy programme (introduced in 2009 to 
encourage domestic uptake and manufacture of PV technology) pays 50 per cent of the 
required total capital for approved projects; the developer then invests 30 per cent and 
borrows 20 per cent from the bank. 
Bank loans are the major source of finance for wind and PV projects. Of the total US$39.6bn 
invested in 2011, developers’ equity investment accounted for 22.48 per cent, bank loans for 
76.04 per cent and government subsidies for 1.47 per cent. 













GW US$bn US$bn Ratio (%) US$bn Ratio (%) US$bn Ratio (%) 
Wind power 17.6 28.2 5.64 20 22.56 80 0 0 
PV power 2.331 11.4       
Ground-mounted 
PV systems 
1.909 10.23 2.79 27.2 7.45 72.8   
Building-mounted 
PV systems 
0.422 1.17 0.48 40.7 0.11 9.2 0.58 50 
Total 19.93 39.6 8.91 22.5 30.12 76.06 0.58 1.46 
Notes: (1) Total investment data is from the United Nations Environment Programme report (UNEP/BNEF 2012). 
(2) PV power installation data is calculated by projects from the Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) database. 
(3) The average exchange rate of yuan to US$ is 6.4588 (issued by the China Foreign Exchange Trading Center, which is 
authorised by the People’s Bank of China). 
(4) At the beginning of 2012, the China Development Bank (CDB), Agricultural Bank of China and Guangdong Development 
Bank issued documents to limit credit approval in PV manufacturing, wind power manufacturing and other overcapacity 
industries. In fact, according to our field survey, the PV manufacturers have not been able to get bank loans since 2011. 
Therefore, in our calculation, when the developer builds centralised PV plants, we assume 100 per cent of total investment 
comes from the developer. When the developer develops distributed PV plants, we assume that 50 per cent of total investment 
comes from the developer and the other half comes from government subsidy. 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013). 
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3.2 Developers of wind and PV generation projects 
State-owned enterprises, including the five major power groups and their subsidiaries, and 
provincial and municipal state-owned enterprises, have been the main developers for both 
wind and PV projects. The state-owned enterprises invested 85 per cent of the total installed 
wind generation capacity in 2011 and 80 per cent of the total accumulated capacity. At the 
end of 2011, there were approximately 60 different state-owned enterprises (subsidiaries 
excluded) engaged in wind power projects (Li Junfeng et al. 2012). Joint venture project 
developers accounted for seven per cent of the domestic market in 2011; private enterprise, 
foreign enterprise and foreign joint enterprise accounted for three per cent, two per cent and 
0.23 per cent of the domestic market respectively. Moreover, wind power equipment 
manufacturers also held two per cent of the market share of wind power generation   
(Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 


















Note: Period: 1 July 1996 – 11 June 2012. 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013), based on data from BNEF (2014). 


































































By comparison, developers have been relatively more diversified in the solar power market 
(Figures 3.3 and 3.4). In 2011, state-owned enterprises accounted for 61 per cent of both 
installed PV capacities and total accumulated PV capacity. PV equipment manufacturers’ 
market share reached 21 per cent for new installed capacity, joint venture project developers 
accounted for ten per cent, while private enterprises and foreign enterprises accounted for 
four per cent and 2.78 per cent respectively. 


















Note: Period: 1 December 2003 – 11 June 2012. 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013), based on data from BNEF (2014). 





















Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013), based on data from BNEF (2014). 
The state-owned enterprises were easily able to get bank loans because of their long-
established business relationships with state-owned banks, with their fixed assets and 
balance sheets to act as the loan guarantee. On the other hand, from the bank’s perspective, 
finance for such projects is not an easy decision. One of the reasons for this is the 
unpredictability of government policy – for example, the value and duration of the FIT, which 











































3.3 Sources of finance 
At the initial stage of wind and PV sector development, foreign governments provided grants 
for most of the projects. Such grants required the Chinese government to provide 
proportional match funding and to purchase the necessary units and equipment from the 
donor country. This is no longer the case now that domestic manufacturing capacity has 
grown. For example, in the Sino-German financial cooperation programme West Village 
Electrification (2001–10), from a total investment of €36.4m, the German government 
provided €26m, which the Chinese government matched with €10.4m. Most of the equipment 
was purchased from Germany (Qi Ye 2013). 
The main finance channels for wind and PV power projects now are domestic bank loans, 
the stock market and bonds. Bank loans are the single most important source of funding for 
wind and PV power projects. Stock market financing has been popular among developers 
since 2009 and the issuance of bonds became an important financial channel after 2010. 
3.3.1 Banks 
Policy banks10 and large state-owned commercial banks have been the main lenders to 
renewable energy project developers. At the moment, international loans, trust loans and 
other sources of capital are gradually entering renewable energy project development. The 
China Development Bank (CDB), as a policy-responsive bank, has the task of providing 
financial support for renewable energy projects. In 2005 it provided loans for seven wind 
power projects as a pilot demonstration. Subsequently, other state-owned commercial banks 
have opened up loan services to renewable energy projects. 
Size of loans: It is estimated that approximately 300bn yuan in loans had been issued 
accumulatively by the end of 2011. By that time, CDB had issued 114.9bn yuan to the wind, 
PV and biomass industries, which helped to add 15GW of new installation in total (CDB 
2012). 
Length of maturity: Wind and PV project developers generally apply for long-term loans,11 
with loan maturity length typically between 10 and 15 years (including one year of wind/PV 
power system construction). Take Huaneng Renewables Corporation Ltd as an example: the 
long-term to short-term loan ratio for 2008, 2009 and 2010 was 66:34 per cent, 80:20 per 
cent and 78:22 per cent respectively. 
Loan ratio: The loan ratio for centralised wind and PV projects is typically 80 per cent. 
Generally, 49.5MW is the typical capacity of a wind power project, which would need a bank 
loan of approximately 350m yuan. On the other hand, most of the centralised PV projects 
have a capacity of 10MW each, which would need a bank loan of about 170m yuan. 
Type of loan: State-owned developers’ credit loans account for a relatively high proportion. 
For example, Longyuan Power Group’s credit loan ratio in 2011 was 69.1 per cent, of which 
the credit bank loan ratio stands at 73.5 per cent. 
Parental company guarantee: When a subsidiary of a large state-owned enterprise 
requests a loan from the bank, its parent company will provide the guarantee. For instance, 
from 2008 to 2011, the guarantee ratio of Longyuan’s parent company, China Guodian 
Corporation, has been 31.3 per cent, 1.8 per cent, 22 per cent and 35.2 per cent 
respectively. 
                                               
10 The Agricultural Development Bank of China, CDB and the Export-Import Bank of China were established as China’s policy 
banks in 1994. 
11 A long-term loan refers to one with maturity above one year; a short-term loan refers to one with maturity equal to or less than 
one year. 
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Interest rate: In accordance with the promulgation of the ‘Notification of People’s Bank of 
China12 regarding interest rate reduction’ in 1996: ‘a financial institute ought to adjust its loan 
interest rate in reference to the benchmark interest rate to industry (adjust downward, no 
adjustment, or adjust upward to a lesser extent), enterprises and products, and of those 
enterprises with higher credibility that are prioritised in the national policies’. Renewable 
energy generation is one of the priority industries according to national industrial policy and 
thus, in principle, enterprises are able to borrow at an interest rate ten per cent lower than 
the benchmark interest rate. Since June 2012, enterprises have been able to borrow with   
20 per cent concession. 
3.3.2 Stock market 
Since bank loans account for almost 80 per cent of total investment in most renewable 
energy projects, the debt ratios of renewable energy developers are generally high, hence 
raising funds from the stock market is a common financial approach to improve their overall 
liability. Stock market finance has been an important source of finance for developers since 
2009. By 16 August 2012, five enterprises had been listed on the stock market, raising a total 
of US$4.895bn. Longyuan Power Group listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) at 
the end of 2009, ranking the eighth-largest initial public offering (IPO) that year. However, the 
overall stock market outlook for the new energy sector has been pessimistic since 2010 and 
it has become difficult to raise a substantial amount of funds through this means. Launching 
after that time, Datang New Energy chose to be listed at a low issue price; Huaneng 
Renewables also lowered its issue price and increased the quantity of institutional 
investors.13 
Table 3.2 Funds raised from the stock market by wind and PV project 
developers 
Enterprise Exchange Date Funds raised (US$bn) 
Longyuan Power Group HKEx 10 December 2009 2.594 
Suntien Green Energy HKEx 13 October 2010 0.4246 
Datang New Energy HKEx 17 December 2010 0.6812 
Huaneng Renewables HKEx 10 June 2011 0.8501 
Huadian Fuxin Energy HKEx 28 June 2012 0.3451 
Note: Period: 1 July 1996 – 16 August 2012. 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013), based on data from BNEF (2014). 
3.3.3 Bonds14 
In 2010, bonds became an important financial channel for project developers. In 2011, 
energy-related enterprises issued 100bn yuan bonds in China, with maturity between two 
and ten years, and interest rates between four per cent and six per cent accordingly. 
However, such financial tools are only available for state-owned enterprises. In 2001, the 
Hong Kong ‘dim sum bond’ market issued a total of 6.3bn yuan, with interest rates varying 
from 4.5 per cent to 6.4 per cent, although only 6 per cent of these bonds have been used for 
the wind and PV sectors (Bédin et al. 2012). Among the renewable energy developers, 
                                               
12 The People’s Bank of China is the central bank of China with the power to control monetary policy and regulate financial 
institutions in China. 
13 Institutional investors are organisations which pool large sums of money and invest those sums in securities, real property 
and other investment assets. They can also include operating companies which decide to invest their profits to some degree in 
these types of assets. Typical investors include banks, insurance companies, retirement or pension funds, hedge funds, 
investment advisors and mutual funds. 
14 In finance, a bond is an instrument of indebtedness of the bond issuer to the holders. It is a debt security, under which the 
issuer owes the holders a debt and, depending on the terms of the bond, is obliged to pay them interest (the coupon) and/or to 
repay the principal at a later date, termed the maturity date. Offshore bonds are those issued abroad. 
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Longyuan Power Group issued 11.474bn yuan bonds in 2011, accounting for 19.4 per cent 
of its total investment finance that year. China Wind Power issued 750m yuan offshore bonds 
at an interest rate of 6.375 per cent in 2011. 
To sum up: in China more than 80 per cent of wind developers and more than 60 per cent of 
solar developers are state-owned enterprises. Such institutions have long-term cooperative 
relations with the state-owned commercial banks and are their most important customers. (In 
the planned economy era (1949–78) the state-owned enterprises were the sole customers of 
state-owned banks.) Therefore, bank credit has always been the most important source of 
finance for China’s renewable energy developers. The stock and bond markets are two 
important supplementary sources. The golden period for China’s renewable energy 
developers and manufacturers to get finance on the stock market was 2006–09, as China 
enacted its Renewable Energy Law and promulgated the Medium and Long-Term 
Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (2007–20) (National Development and 
Reform Commission 2007). These policies suggested long-term government support for 
renewable energy and gave confidence to interested investors. During this period, the 
venture capital/private equity institutions also played an important role as, full of optimism 
about the international renewable energy market at that time, they assisted renewable 
energy manufacturers and developers to get listed. After 2010, the stock market cooled down 




4 Case studies – the wind power sector 
Based on Chinese wind energy investment data from the BNEF database, this research 
examined four case studies: three from the peak investment period (November–December 
2007, April–October 2008, and September 2010–May 2011) and one from the lowest 
investment period (November 2011–present). The first case study is the public listing of 
China’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, Goldwind Science & Technology, which occurred 
in the investment peak period November–December 2007. The second dates from another 
peak investment period, April–October 2008, when the market featured a significant increase 
in asset finance.15 The third is from the peak investment period September 2010–May 2011, 
and the fourth is from a period of low investment in November 2011. We selected each case 
study based on its investment data, so that we can analyse the driving factors for its 
investors. 
Figure 4.1 Investment in China’s wind power industry, 2004–12 
Source: Authors’ own, based on data from BNEF (2014). 
4.1 Wind power case study 1 – Goldwind Science & Technology 
listed on the public market 
Goldwind – China’s largest wind turbine manufacturer – is a typical case within China’s wind 
turbine manufacturing industry and was one of the first turbine manufacturers to receive 
support from the Chinese government. On 26 December 2007 Goldwind was listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with 1.745bn yuan (US$238m) raised via IPO. It was China’s 
first listed turbine manufacturing company. In this case study we analyse the development of 
Goldwind, focusing on each of its financing events, in order to identify the roles played by 
different stakeholders. Their roles and underlying motivations are further analysed in the light 
of the face-to-face interviews conducted, and by a review of the literature, in particular from 
the perspective of coalitions and alliances. 
 
                                               
15 Asset finance: all money invested in renewable energy generation projects, whether from internal company balance sheets, 
from debt finance, or from equity finance. 
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4.1.1 Goldwind’s development 
The Goldwind company was founded in 2001, evolving from its predecessor Xinjiang Wind 
Energy Company, affiliated with Xinjiang Department of Water Resources. Previously, 
Xinjiang Wind Energy Company had been responsible for the installation and operation of 
wind turbines donated by the Danish and German governments to Xinjiang. In 1997, the 
company imported technology from Jacobs, a German company, and started to manufacture 
600kW wind turbines. This technology transfer was supported by research funds from 
China’s Ministry of Science and Technology. In 1999, the first ten turbines were completed, 
of which six were installed in Goldwind’s own wind farm, because there was hardly any 
market demand for wind turbines in China at that time. The Chinese government held its first 
round of concession tendering for wind power projects in 2003, when Goldwind won a large 
order to manufacture 100MW wind turbines. By the end of the sixth round of concession 
tendering in 2009, Goldwind was the supplier of 20 per cent of newly installed wind power 
capacity in China that year. Important events in the development of the company are 
recorded in Table 4.1. 
4.1.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
The key actors in this case include: central government (including the State Council, Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Science and Technology and NDRC); a state-owned enterprise, 
Xinjiang Wind Energy Company Ltd; and a private company, Goldwind. 
Central government 
Central government played the role of policymaker. The priority of central government was to 
establish the manufacture of wind power equipment in China and nurture China’s own 
companies. The support Goldwind received from the central government was twofold: 
stimulation of the domestic market, and funds for R&D. 
Domestic market support 
Before 2003, China’s wind power development mainly depended on international grants. All 
wind equipment was imported because of China’s lack of technology, equipment and 
professionals. In 2003 the NDRC initiated tendering for wind power concessions and 
required bidders to be consortia consisting of developers and wind turbine manufacturers. 
The required percentage of domestic equipment purchased was to be no lower than           
70 per cent. The commission hoped to support the domestic manufacturing industry by 
expanding the domestic market. 
R&D support 
Goldwind undertook and accomplished the following national projects: 
• the 9th Five-Year Plan key project ‘R&D of 600kW Wind Turbine Manufacturing’ 
• the 10th Five-Year Plan project ‘R&D of 750kW Wind Turbine’ 
• the National No. 863 research subjects ‘R&D of 1.2MW Direct-Drive Wind Turbine’ 
and ‘R&D of MW-Class Wind Turbine and Key Components’. 
In 2005 the NDRC approved a two-year grant of 220m yuan to support the development of 
the domestic industry for renewables. Establishing the manufacture of wind power equipment 
in China was one of the five key areas the grant supported. In 2008, Goldwind established 




Table 4.1 Goldwind – chronicle of events 
Date Event 
1986 Xinjiang Wind Energy Company Ltd established. One of the earliest corporations in China with 
principal business in wind power plant construction and operation. Remains one of Goldwind’s 
major stakeholders. 
1989 Xinjiang Wind Energy bought 13.150MW turbines from Danish company Bonus with a US$3.2m 
grant from the Danish government, and set up Wind Power Plant No.1 in Daban City, connected to 
grid. Gained crucial experience of wind power plant operation and maintenance. 
1994 Ministry of Electric Power Industry promulgated the ‘Wind Power Plants Grid-Connected Operation 
Regulations’ (trial): required grid companies to facilitate connection of wind power plants to the 
nearest grid and to buy their electricity. 
1996 Through the German government’s aid programme ‘Gold Plan’, the total installed capacity of wind 
power plants increased from 2.05MW to 6.1MW, including the two then largest turbines in China of 
600kW. The introduction of different turbines enabled further Chinese R&D. 
1997 Xinjiang Wind Energy imported 600kW wind turbine manufacturing technology from Jacobs in 
Germany. 
1998 Xinjiang New Wind Science & Engineering Trade Corporation established. With the support of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s Department of Science and Technology, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology provided a 3m yuan research fund for Xinjiang New Wind, Xinjiang Wind 
Energy and Xinjiang Wind Power Research Institute to undertake the 9th Five-Year Plan scientific 
and technological project – R&D of 600kW Wind Turbine Manufacturing. 
1999 Successful development of 600kW turbines: ten manufactured. The whole development process 
cost more than 40m yuan, of which 20m yuan was from loans, and 3m was a grant from the 




Xinjiang New Wind Science & Engineering Trade Company reorganised as Goldwind Corporation. 
Its registered capital was 32.3m yuan: 72% from state-owned shares,a 1.27% from public shares,b 
and 26.73% from ‘natural person’ shares.c 
2002 Goldwind established assembling base of large-sized wind power turbines with annual production 
capacity of 200 sets of 600kW–750kW. 
2003 In competition with the General Electric Company (GE) and Mitsubishi, Goldwind won the first wind 
power concession project in China and got a 100MW project from power company Yuedian in 
Guangdong province. 
2005 Goldwind’s first 1.2MW turbine put into operation in Daban City wind power plant. 
2006 Goldwind achieved 33% of domestic market share. Its sales turnover ranked it as the number one 
wind turbine manufacturer in China and number ten in the world. 
2007 The first five 1.5MW turbines put into operation in Daban City’s wind power plant. Goldwind’s 
capital increased to 450m yuan, among which the state-owned corporate shares accounted for 
41.33%, the public corporate shares 23.64%, and the natural person shares 35.03%. Listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in December, and general capital increased to 500m yuan. 
2008 Goldwind won the concession tender with 810m kWh in Gansu Jiuquan city. It also purchased 
70% equity of German company VENSYS and established R&D centres in Beijing, Xinjiang and 
Germany. First Chinese wind turbine manufacturer equipped with fully independent R&D capacity 
and intellectual property rights. Its products were also sold on the international market. 
2010 Goldwind listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange: 454,544,000 shares issued priced at HK$17.98 
(US$2.32); HK$8bn (US$1.03bn) was raised. 
2011 Goldwind signed ‘strategic cooperation agreement’ with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
gaining 10bn yuan financing credit to support projects and operations. 
Notes: aState-owned corporate share owners refer to state-owned enterprises; bpublic corporate share owners refer to private 
enterprises, including private equity funds; c‘natural person’ share owners refer to natural persons,16 e.g. Mr Gang Wu, the 
company founder and legal representative. 
Source: Goldwind (2014). 
                                               
16 Natural person: in jurisprudence, a natural person is a real human being, as opposed to a legal person which may be a private 
(i.e. business entity) or public (i.e. government) organisation. In many cases, fundamental human rights are implicitly granted 
only to natural persons. 
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The major challenge faced by central government for the development of renewable energy 
included a lack of relevant technology, talent, equipment and knowledge. By working with 
Goldwind the government began to meet this challenge. For example, Xinjiang Wind Energy 
spent eight years (1988–96) learning how to install and operate wind farms, learning about 
the technology and then training the first batch of wind power technicians. After the 
introduction of the German 600kW wind turbine in 1996, Xinjiang Wind Energy began to 
research and develop new models in cooperation with international research institutions (for 
example, VENSYS in Germany). In 2008, Goldwind acquired a 70 per cent stake in VENSYS 
and embarked on the road of independent research. 
Local government – Xinjiang government 
Xinjiang government also played the role of policymaker. Its priority was to support the 
manufacturing sector led by Goldwind. Local government faced the same challenges as the 
central government. 
State-owned enterprises – Xinjiang Wind Energy Company and others 
State-owned enterprises played the role of investors. When Goldwind was founded in 2001, 
the state-owned corporate share was 72 per cent. Xinjiang Wind Energy Company was a 
subordinate organisation of Xinjiang Department of Water Resources. Before 1997, the 
company conducted various activities including owning petrol stations, but after Goldwind 
won the 100MW project in the first concession tender in 2003, wind power became its 
primary business. The priority for state-owned enterprises is profit. 
Goldwind 
Goldwind played the role of policymaker and beneficiary. The company was invited to 
participate in designing the policy and process of concession tendering. Other participants 
included central government, local government and the grid companies (interview 1). 
Goldwind was also the beneficiary of this concession tendering policy (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Goldwind’s share of onshore wind power concession tenders 
 Year Bid scale (MW) Tender won by Goldwind (MW) 
First tender 2003 200 100 
Second tender 2004 300 N/A 
Third tender 2005 450 N/A 
Fourth tender 2006 700 200 
Fifth tender 2007 950 300 
Sixth tender 2009 5,250 1,300.5 
Source: Goldwind (2014). 
The priority for Goldwind was production. The challenges for the company included a lack of 
experience, technology, market and business model. In the early days, China had no wind 
turbine manufacturing enterprises and lacked experience. Compared to many better-
developed regions in China, Xinjiang was remote, with a poor science and technology 
environment and substandard transport. At the time, China’s wind turbines depended on 
international grants; therefore, the domestic market was quite small. As a company located in 
Xinjiang, Goldwind had to find ways to overcome such difficulties. Another issue confronted 
by Goldwind was its business model. The company focused on R&D and marketing, and its 
manufacturing business was limited to equipment assembly, which largely relied on suppliers 
of machine parts and components. 
From a technological perspective, Goldwind learned from purchasing and studying foreign 
technologies. Then Goldwind began to cooperate on R&D with VENSYS, until it purchased 
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its 70 per cent stake in the company in 2008. All of these measures were taken to overcome 
the technological constraints step by step. 
In terms of sales, Goldwind did not have a domestic market until 2003, and sold only several 
sets of its product before this date. R&D began in 1997. In 1999, Goldwind developed and 
produced ten sets of 600kW wind turbines, four of which were sold to Xinjiang Wind Energy 
and six of which were kept as Goldwind’s own assets. An army troop in Xinjiang bought two 
sets in 2000 and Chengde Power Industry in Hebei province ordered six sets in 2001. 
However, in the first round of concession tendering held by the central government in 2003, 
Goldwind became the equipment supplier to the Guangdong Huilai Shipaishan 100MW wind 
power plant and sold 167 wind turbines. In the following years, the rapidly expanding 
domestic market provided many more opportunities for Goldwind’s development. 
4.1.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
While developing policy and working out how to organise the tenders for wind plant 
concessions, the central government and the manufacturing industry developed an informal 
alliance (interview 1). China’s central government decided to develop a domestic wind 
turbine manufacturing industry by stimulating the domestic market. The concession tender 
policy was developed jointly by the central government, local government, grid companies 
and wind turbine manufacturers. China’s goal was not only to support a domestic 
manufacturing industry, but also to establish the country’s own brand of wind turbine 
manufacturers. Therefore, the wind farm concession tender policy required consortia of 
manufacturers and developers, and stipulated that 70 per cent of the equipment had to be 
manufactured locally. These requirements blocked international manufacturers from China’s 
wind power market. For this reason, in the first wind power concession tender, although 
Goldwind had only four years’ experience of wind turbine manufacturing, it still won – beating 
foreign companies GE and Mitsubishi, which had far more experience. 
Table 4.3 Goldwind – information matrix 
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Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
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4.2 Wind power case study 2 – investment peak, April–October 
2008 
April to October 2008 was one of China’s wind power investment peak periods (see Figure 
4.1). It featured investment in asset financing – i.e. investment focused on the development 
of wind farms. During this period, China had not yet introduced its FIT for wind power 
generation. What motivated the investment in wind farms? This case study attempts to 
identify the main drivers of wind farm investment during this period, and how they were 
created. 
4.2.1 Main drivers of wind farm investment, April–October 2008 
Prior to April 2008 there were two events that had a major impact on Chinese wind power 
development. The first was the enactment of the Renewable Energy Law and its supporting 
policies. The law was a strategic policy which did not include implementation guidelines and 
further rules. Supporting policies were gradually introduced, including important ones on 
cost-sharing, establishing a renewable energy fund, grid access, and so on (see Section 2.2, 
and Table 4.4). These policies provided the legal basis for the grid connection of wind farms. 
Another key event was the change to the rules for the fifth concession tender which was 
conducted from August 2007–February 2008. The FIT set by the tender was high enough for 
developers to be sure of making a profit. The tariffs set by these projects were also to be 
used as a reference price for wind power projects in neighbouring areas. The increase in the 
tariff stimulated the construction of wind farms during this period. 
Table 4.4 Investment peak April–October 2008 – chronicle of events 
Date Event 
1 January 2006 Renewable Energy Law came into effect, with goals to increase energy supply, 
improve energy mix, ensure energy security and protect the environment. 
4 January 2006 NDRC issued the ‘Interim Measures on Renewable Generation Tariff and Cost 
Sharing Management’ and directed its pricing department to set a nationwide 
renewables surcharge to be levied on electricity price at a uniform rate based on 
consumption. 
30 May 2006 Ministry of Finance promulgated ‘Interim Measures on the Renewable Energy 
Development Fund’. Central government fund for renewable energy established. 
25 July 2007 State Electricity Regulatory Commission enacted ‘Measures on Grid Company – 
Full Amount Purchase of Renewable Generation’. Required grid companies to 
connect wind farms to grid and buy the electricity they generated. 
31 August 2007 The State Council released the ‘Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for 
Renewable Energy in China’. Set a target of 10% of China’s primary energy 
consumption to come from renewable energy sources, including hydropower, 
wind and solar by 2010; 15% by 2020. Allocated a quota for renewable energy 
development by large energy enterprises and grid companies. 
August 2007–
February 2008 
Fifth concession tender of four wind power projects with a total scale of 700MW. 
NDRC changed rules: average value of FIT offered for constructing the wind farm 
would be calculated, and bidder with offer closest to the average would win 
(previously, went to lowest bidder). Wind farms could now be operated profitably. 
4.2.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges in the Renewable Energy 
Law’s legislative process 
The key actors in this case include central government (State Council, National People’s 
Congress (NPC), NDRC, local government (provincial people’s congress), state-owned 
enterprises (grid companies, energy enterprises, wind farm developers), and other 
institutions (universities, research institutes, enterprises, non-governmental organisations). 
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Central government 
Central government was the legislator. The Renewable Energy Law was proposed by the 
Standing Committee of the NPC, while the congress’s Environmental and Resources 
Protection Committee consigned the drafting work to the NDRC. The national congress 
played the most important role as the legislature. During the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, China’s delegation was headed 
by the prime minister whose delegation also consisted of national congress members. 
Renewable energy development was one of the focus topics of this conference, and the 
‘Action Plan of the World Leaders’ Summit on Sustainable Development’ presented at the 
meeting proposed to provide electricity access to three billion people worldwide with 
renewable generation. In 2003 the Standing Committee listed the development of the 
Renewable Energy Law in its agenda and asked its Environmental and Resources Protection 
Committee to organise the drafting (Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5 Development and adoption of China’s Renewable Energy Law 
Date Event 
June 2003 NPC Standing Committee listed the development of the Renewable Energy Law in 
its agenda of the year, and asked its Environmental and Resources Protection 
Committee to organise the drafting. 
August 2003 As requested by NPC’s Environmental and Resources Protection Committee, 
NDRC developed and proposed the first draft. 
August 2004 Environmental and Resources Protection Committee completed the second draft, 
and circulated it among over 100 institutions, including State Council departments, 
different ministries, people’s congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, 
municipalities directly under the State Council, as well as universities, research 
organisations, businesses and community groups, for comments. 
November 2004 Renewable Energy Law (draft) was submitted to NPC Standing Committee for 
approval. 
December 2004 The 13th meeting of the NPC Standing Committee conducted its first evaluation of 
the Renewable Energy Law (draft). 
February 2005 The 14th meeting of the NPC Standing Committee conducted its second evaluation 
of the Renewable Energy Law (draft), voted and passed it on 28 February 2005. 
President Hu Jintao signed Presidential Decree No.33, which enacted the law. The 
law came into effect on 1 January 2006. 
April 2005 NPC Standing Committee sent an official letter to the State Council, requesting the 
latter to initiate and coordinate the development of 12 regulations and technical 
specifications in order to support the implementation of the Renewable Energy Law. 
In formulating the Renewable Energy Law, the major barrier the NPC’s Environmental and 
Resources Protection Committee encountered was lack of knowledge on the subject. As a 
result, the drafting work was delegated to the NDRC, then further to the commission’s 
Energy Research Institute. It only took the institute a year to develop the first draft as it was 
already experienced in renewable research. The consultation on the first draft was wide: as 
well as being sent to all the government institutions (both national and local), universities, 
research organisations, etc., it was also put online for comments and suggestions from the 
public, including international organisations. 
Local governments, state-owned enterprises, other institutions 
These institutions provided comments, and hence contributed to the development of the 
Renewable Energy Law. They were mostly government institutions and state-owned 
enterprises, whose priority is to provide political support. 
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In the Renewable Energy Law formulation and review process, it was unusual that all 
stakeholders showed unanimous support. As a result, the law’s development only took a 
year and a half, and the voting at the NPC Standing Committee also went very smoothly. 
Normally a law could not be passed until its third evaluation due to objections, yet this one 
was passed unanimously at its second evaluation. The whole process took less than two 
years, which is rare in China’s legislative history. 
Stakeholders supported the law for two reasons. Firstly, the scale of the renewable energy 
industry was too small at the time to threaten other stakeholders such as thermal power 
companies, grid companies, etc. Grid connection was discussed and grid companies had no 
objection, as the generation amount was hardly significant. Secondly, there was no 
administrative institution for renewable energy and no vested interests. This led to the 
efficient development and promulgation of the law (interview 1). 
4.2.3 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges in the fifth concession 
tender 
The key actors in the concession tender process include central government (NDRC) and the 
private sector (wind developers and manufacturers). 
Central government 
The central government’s priority during this period was to provide developers with a 
reasonable regional FIT for wind generation through tendering. For the first to fourth 
concession tenders, a lowest-price policy was adopted, where bidders who offered the 
lowest price for constructing and running the wind farm would win. This led to malicious 
competition, where some enterprises bid much lower than cost just to seize the opportunity 
to enter the sector. Prices paid in the first to fourth tenders were all much lower than needed 
for the project to be viable. Private companies who won the tender with a very low price 
seized the right for development yet did not actually start development for a long time. 
The NDRC’s change of the rules for the fifth concession tender was critical in that for the first 
time, it made it possible for the companies who built and operated wind farms to make a 
profit. It was the result of persistent lobbying by the developers, equipment manufacturers 
and research institutes. Instead of the lowest price winning, the bidder who offered the price 
closest to the average of all those offered won. This, with the help of carbon revenue via the 
Clean Development Mechanism,17 resulted in a reasonable return for the 
developers/operators. As a result, China’s domestic wind power market started to bloom. 
Private sector – wind developers and manufacturers 
The private sector’s priority was to pursue financial rewards. Its challenge during this period 
was fierce competition. 
China’s wind industry developers and manufacturers had considerable lobbying power. 
Developers and manufacturers had a very strong network of relationships, as leaders of 
large enterprises usually had close relationships with government officials. They also built 
networks with research institutions and universities via research cooperation. In order to 
persuade the NDRC to change the concession tender rules, wind power developers and 
manufacturers lobbied together with research institutions and government officials from other 
institutions. The alliance succeeded. On the other hand, this also showed the lack of other 
                                               
17 Clean Development Mechanism: ‘The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a 
country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol… to implement an emission-
reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each 
equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets’ (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change 2014). 
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political means to change government policy, so lobbying behind the scenes was their only 
option. 
4.2.4 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
In the Renewable Energy Law formulation and review process, no alliance was formed. 
Although the first draft was circulated extremely widely, those to whom it went were almost 
all dependent in some way upon government (not least, financially) and so usually offered it 
their political support. On the other hand, the scale of the renewable energy industry was too 
small at that time to threaten other stakeholders such as thermal power companies, grid 
companies, etc. 
In the process of changing the rule for the fifth concession tender, wind developers, wind 
turbine manufacturers, research institutes, and government officials formed an informal 
alliance. As the ‘lowest price wins’ rule of the first four concession tenders resulted in 
malicious competition and made it impossible to make a profit, wind project developers and 
turbine manufacturers began to lobby the NDRC; in the process of lobbying, research 
institutions and some government officials joined the lobbying team. Objectively speaking, 
the purpose for these research institutions and government officials was not merely to protect 
the interests of developers and manufacturers; their concern was about how to make China’s 
wind industry viable. Local government officials were more concerned about the impact of 
wind project development on local taxes, because if the wind plant failed, it was unable to 
contribute to local tax revenue. Although the motivation of the stakeholders varied, they all 
wanted to have a reasonable price for the wind farm developers and operators, and had 
reached a consensus in this regard. However, such an alliance is short term by nature, and 
no permanent institution was set up to express their interests and demands, so it remained 
an informal coalition of interests. 
Table 4.6 Investment peak April–October 2008 – information matrix 
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4.3 Wind power case study 3 – investment peak, September 
2010–May 2011 
From September 2010 to May 2011, investment peaked again for wind project development 
(Figure 4.1). From the perspective of funding sources, this peak also featured asset finance. 
This was the highest peak of all between 2004 (when large-scale deployment began) and 
2013, in what was the main period of investment in the wind industry. As Chinese wind farm 
developers acquired about 80 per cent of their investment capital from bank loans, so the 
peak in investment also indicates a peak in financing assets with bank loans. In addition, the 
nine months from September 2010 to May 2011 also featured the investment of extensive 
funds from the stock market. We selected this period for a case study in order to find out 
what the drivers of increased investment from both sources were, and whether alliances 
were formed for this. 
4.3.1 Major drivers for the investment peak during September 2010–May 
2011 
Judging from the policies and major events listed in Table 4.7, increased investment in this 
period was driven by three main factors. 
Table 4.7 Investment peak, September 2010–May 2011 – chronicle of 
events 
Date Event 
1 August 2009 NDRC set differentiated tariffs per kWh for onshore wind generation based on four 
wind energy zones: 0.51 yuan (US$0.075, £0.05), 0.54 yuan, 0.58 yuan and       
0.61 yuan (significantly higher than the average rate of 0.34 yuan/kWh paid for coal-
generated electricity). 
22 January 2010 NEA and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) jointly issued ‘Tentative Measures 
for the Implementation and Management of Offshore Wind Power Development and 
Construction’, marking the start of China’s offshore wind power development. 
April–September 
2010 
NEA held the first concession tender for offshore wind projects; total capacity of 
1,000MW. The winners were: Sinovel Wind Group (Binhai and Sheyang), Shanghai 
Electric and Shandong Luneng Group (Dongtai), and Goldwind (Dafeng). 
28 May 2010 The State Grid Company announced plans for grid connection and electricity 
transmission for seven major wind farms: Hami, Jiuquan, Hebei, Jilin, Jiangsu, 
Mengdong and Mengxi (in total, 60% of installed capacity nationwide). 
1 October 2010 Ming Yang Wind Power Group listed on the New York Stock Exchange; raised 
US$0.35bn. 
8 October 2010 Goldwind listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange; valued at US$7.8bn. 
10 October 2010 State Council promulgated ‘Decision of Accelerating the Cultivating and Developing 
of Strategically Important Emerging Industries’, and encouraged banks to lend to 
them, including for renewable energy generation. 
2010 CDB offered credit lines worth US$43.6bn to renewable energy manufacturing 
companies, including solar panel producers (LDK Solar, Suntech, Yingli Solar and 
Trina Solar) and wind turbine makers (Sinovel and Goldwind), each borrowing 
US$6.5bn on average. 
13 January 2011 Sinovel Wind Group listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange; raised 9.459bn yuan. 
Sources: NetEase Finance (2010); Financial Community (2011). 
Firstly, strong positive signals were given by various wind sector-specific government 
policies, including setting a tariff for onshore wind generation, plans made for developing 
seven wind generation bases, and the holding of a concession tender for offshore wind 
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projects, among others. The set tariff made the revenue to be earned from wind farms 
predictable. 
Secondly, central government introduced its policy of developing seven ‘strategically 
important and emerging industries’, naming the renewable energy industry as one of them. 
The government encouraged financial institutions to provide support for these industries, with 
the CDB – as a policy bank tasked with helping to implement government strategy – taking 
the first move in providing loans. 
Thirdly, international capital flows increased, with a notable increase in the open market. In 
the context of the international financial crisis of 2008, a large amount of international 
investment was attracted to China’s wind industry because, as explained above, the Chinese 
government had provided very clear support for the industry, and the industry itself looked 
very promising (interview 2). 
4.3.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
The key actors in this case include central government (NDRC, NEA, SOA), local 
government, the CDB and other state-owned banks, and the private sector (wind turbine 
manufacturers, wind power developers). 
Central government 
Central government was the policymaker. During this period, the priorities of the central 
government were to increase energy supply, upgrade the energy mix, and address climate 
change; sustain economic growth and find new opportunities for growth. The introduction of a 
wind generation tariff and inception of an offshore wind power market were expected to serve 
the first three goals, while the economic goals were addressed through the ‘Decision of 
Accelerating the Cultivating and Developing of Strategically Important Emerging Industries’, 
developed in 2009 and launched in 2010, during the continuing international financial crisis. 
The major problem for wind farm development during this period was cross-management. 
Onshore wind farm management was hampered by conflicts between central and local 
government. The latter approved a vast number of projects which resulted in uncontrolled 
expansion of installed capacity. Central government developed its renewable energy 
development plan based on grid connection capacity, but the number of wind farms far 
exceeded this. According to the ‘Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable 
Energy in China’, installed capacity of wind power would reach 5GW in 2010, yet in fact this 
goal had already been achieved in 2007. In 2010 the cumulative installed capacity of wind 
generation surged to 44.7GW. Local government approved too many wind power projects: 
although it encouraged the rapid development of the wind power market in terms of 
manufacturing, it also created a bottleneck for grid access. 
For offshore wind development, the problem was conflicts between different authorities. The 
‘Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China’ was 
implemented by the NEA, while the oceans were managed by the SOA. In addition, a large 
area of the ocean was also managed by the military. Such bureaucratic divisions made 
construction of offshore wind farms very difficult. For instance, after the first round of 
tendering for offshore wind projects, the winning bidders did not start to construct offshore 
wind farms as planned, because the NEA had not yet reached an agreement with the SOA. 
Therefore, the latter did not approve the construction of offshore farms. This inevitably led to 
increased construction costs. 
The main challenge for the central government in this period, however, was the economic 
slowdown. From 2008 the international financial crisis curbed China’s heavily export-
dependent economy. To recover, China enacted its stimulus package of 4tn yuan in 
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November 2008, and began its support of ‘strategically important and emerging new 
industries’ in 2009. 
Local government 
The priority for local governments was to pursue economic development in their area, largely 
because economic growth is a significant element in the performance evaluation of their 
officials. Wind farm construction involves a large amount of fixed asset investment, which 
significantly increases the total investment within a region – a key factor for the measurement 
of economic growth. So local governments had strong incentives to support the wind power 
industry, whose developers were mostly large state-owned enterprises with strong capital 
capacity. As a result, the various local governments vied with each other to build wind farms 
and approved a large number of projects, which led to excess capacity and considerable 
resource waste. Local government officials’ concerns about their own prospects for 
promotion were therefore a key factor in the overcapacity of China’s wind power industry. 
China Development Bank and other state-owned banks 
The China Development Bank was both policymaker and implementer. Its mission is to 
provide medium- and long-term credit and finance to implement the country’s medium- and 
long-term national economic development strategies (CDB 2005). In this case, the bank’s 
priority was to provide financial support to recently identified strategically important and 
emerging industries. At the end of 2009, bank officials met with representatives from the 
NEA, NDRC and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and signed 
cooperation memos with them. The bank was also invited to draft the State Council’s 
‘Decision of Accelerating the Cultivating and Developing of Strategically Important and 
Emerging Industries’ (Zhao 2012). In 2010, CDB lent substantial sums of money to 
companies in both the solar and wind power sectors (Jackson 2011). 
In supporting the wind industry, the major challenge for the bank and other large state-owned 
commercial banks was their lack of knowledge about it. In fact, when CDB was offering 
large-scale loans to renewable energy industries, China’s wind turbine manufacturing 
industry was already experiencing overcapacity (as was the PV). The MIIT pointed this out 
as early as 2009. However, its analysis was questioned by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and did not receive any serious attention. The extensive loans offered by the 
bank in 2010 resulted in even further overcapacity of the two industries. 
Private sector – turbine manufacturers and wind farm developers 
The priority of turbine manufacturers and wind farm developers was to expand their market 
share. From 2010 to 2011, turbine manufacturers were busy with this. The biggest ones, 
such as Sinovel, Goldwind and Ming Yang, conducted two forms of attention-attracting 
activities: getting listed on the stock market, and bidding for the first round of concessions for 
developing offshore wind farms. 
The challenge for turbine manufacturers was the serious oversupply of the whole industry, 
which induced fierce competition in the domestic market. In the light of such a highly 
competitive market in China, they all strove for capital expansion both at home and abroad. 
4.3.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
No coalition between stakeholders was found in this case study. The substantial loans 
offered to wind manufacturers were largely driven by central government policies. The CDB 
is a state-owned bank tasked to provide financial support to implement national strategy. 
From a political perspective, CDB is actually part of the central government and has 
obligations to function as a financial institution for the central government. In addition, large 
turbine manufacturers were also considered as borrowers promising a good return by state-
owned commercial banks. The case study of Goldwind showed that the cooperation between 
banks and turbine manufacturers started as early as 1999. 
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In terms of the listing of wind turbine manufacturers and wind farm construction by overseas 
developers, it is a result of the free choice of international capital. No coalition was found for 
the companies’ stock market listings either. 
Table 4.8 Investment peak, September 2010–May 2011 – information 
matrix 
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Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
4.4 Wind power case study 4 – investment trough, November 
2011–present 
Between 2004 and 2010, China’s annual installed wind generation capacity growth rate was 
117 per cent on average; however, negative growth began in 2011. Compared with the 
previous rapid growth in China’s wind power industry, investments for the first time went into 
a trough, where they have remained since November 2011. What were the reasons for this 
falling off? This case study looks into the important events of this period to find out. 
4.4.1 Reasons for the investment trough since November 2011 
From July to August 2011, the NEA enacted three major policies for wind power 
development in the country. These policies required all onshore wind power projects to be 
subject to its approval, and it would implement an annual wind power development plan in 
order to bring development under its control. In addition, policies and norms were also 
adopted for wind power equipment manufacturers and wind farm development, construction 
and grid connections. These measures effectively cooled down the growth rate and kept the 
number of projects for that year under control. The NEA also raised the technical thresholds 
for grid connection of wind farms. In terms of offshore wind power development, it issued the 
‘Interim Measures for Development and Construction of Offshore Wind Farms’, which made 
developing offshore wind power more difficult. 
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Table 4.9 Investment trough since November 2011 – chronicle of major 
events 
Date Event 
July 2011 NEA began ‘annual approval management’ nationwide. It issued the ‘Notice on Enacting 
the Schedule of First Batch of Wind Farms for the “12th Five-Year Plan” Period’, which 
planned a total capacity of 26.83GW for the country, with 12.75GW that could be 
approved by central government and 14.08GW by local government. No additional 
projects outside the proposed list could be approved. 
NEA and SOA jointly released ‘Interim Measures for Development and Construction of 
Offshore Wind Farms’. These measures: specified requirements for offshore wind farm 
planning, pre-feasibility and feasibility studies; allocated responsibilities to related 
institutions; set requirements for offshore wind farm construction and operation; and 
established the principle that offshore wind farms should be no less than 10km offshore, 
and no less than 10 metres deep with the beach being over 10km wide. Four offshore 
wind power projects had to relocate. 
25 August 
2011 
NEA issued ‘Tentative Method of Wind Power Development, Exploitation and 
Construction’: local governments should examine and approve wind power plant projects 
following the construction and yearly development plan; any project that had not 
undergone this approval was ineligible for electricity price subsidies from the National 
Renewable Energy Development Fund; wind power licensing would be integrated into 
national unified planning; local governments could no longer license wind power plants 
below 50MW. 
2011 Release of 18 technical standards for wind power projects, covering wind farm 
development cost calculation, wind power equipment manufacturing, grid connection 
design, wind generation quality tests, etc. 
Source: Adapted from Li Junfeng et al. (2012). 
4.4.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
Key actors in this case include central government (NEA and SOA), local government, and 
wind project developers. 
Central government 
Central government played the role of policymaker and regulator. The priority of central 
government was to control the rate of wind power development. Grid connection conflicts 
were becoming prominent in 2010, with 30 per cent of installed plants unconnected in that 
year. Moreover, the public started to question the quality of wind farm projects – the media 
reported the collapse of more than ten wind turbines (Li Junfeng et al. 2012). Therefore, in 
the ‘Tentative Method of Wind Power Development, Exploitation and Construction’, the NEA 
withdrew the authority for approval from local governments and made it part of national 
planning. 
The major challenge at the central government level was cross-sectoral management of 
renewable energy. Offshore wind power development was particularly affected. The planning 
and approval process for offshore wind farms lay with multiple administrative agencies in 
charge of the ocean: fishing, shipping, military and environmental protection. The difficulties 
of coordination between them severely undermined offshore wind power development. 
The division of approval rights for onshore wind farms was also a big problem. According to 
existing policy, provincial Development and Reform Commissions were entitled to examine 
and approve projects with a capacity of less than 50MW. As a result, many wind power 
plants with a capacity of 49.5MW had been constructed in order to avoid the national-level 




Local governments’ interests were restricted. The central government enacted the annual 
schedule management of the country’s wind power development, which deprived local 
government of its previous approval rights for wind farms with a capacity of less than 50MW, 
so reducing investment in, and the growth of, the local economy. Wind farm construction not 
only brought local government fixed assets and tax revenue, but its strong, heavily 
capitalised state-owned enterprise developers also tended to bring in associated investment 
for other projects. 
The challenge for local governments was economic performance, which (as already stated) 
was a crucial measure of their officials’ performance. Although local governments’ 
behaviours are subject to various influences, the central government’s evaluation of their 
performance is the most significant, and its methods of evaluation were drawn up during the 
period of transformation from a planned to a market economy – hence the emphasis on 
economic growth as a measure. In recent years, the central government has reduced the 
importance of economic indicators in their evaluation, but, in practice, they are still the most 
salient (interview 3). 
Wind developers 
Wind farm developers’ interests also suffered. Access to the grid and selling the power they 
generated had been a problem; conflicts between developers and grid companies were on 
the rise. Although the NEA implemented the schedule for national wind power development, 
no guarantee was provided for grid connection and power sales. Because of such risks, the 
construction of some approved projects – for example, one in Gansu province by Longyuan 
Power Group – was delayed (interview 4). 
For wind power developers, the most important consideration is, of course, profitability. They 
stop developing new projects when grid connection and power sales cannot be arranged. 
There are two big risks for developing wind farms. Firstly, payment of the FIT is usually 
delayed by one year, which poses challenges for the developers’ cash flow. It also makes 
banks hesitant to provide loans with tariff revenue as security. Secondly, policy changes 
made offshore wind projects particularly risky. The ‘Interim Measures for Development and 
Construction of Offshore Wind Farms’, released in 2011, introduced more detailed 
specifications. This necessitated the relocation of four offshore projects with a total capacity 
of 1GW approved in 2010 by tender concession. Construction of these four projects has still 
not started. 
4.4.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
In this case study, no alignments were found. Recession in onshore wind development 
investment was caused by central government control through the NEA’s schedule. Offshore 
wind development investment slowed down because of specific policy changes. 
In the wind power development process, the main stakeholders involved are central 
government, wind farm developers, wind turbine manufacturers, local governments, banks 
and capital markets. The central government acts as the guide for wind power financing, 
leveraging the involvement of various stakeholders through policy tools. In the four case 
studies in this chapter, the central government, in order to stimulate the manufacturing 
industry through the domestic market, conducted a series of concession tenders. An informal 
coalition was established between the central government, wind farm developers, wind 
turbine manufacturers and local government. 
In addition, when local governments were approving wind farm constructions, they formed a 
coalition with wind power developers. Although the two had different sets of interests, both 
could be realised through the same project. As a result, interest exchange appeared between 
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the two. Local governments would generally provide wind developers with infrastructure, 
project approval, and assistance in grid access negotiation, while developers would make a 
commitment to make other investments unrelated to wind power. For local government, this 
is a very typical practice of ‘exchange for local economic development through offering 
resource’. Such alliances were usually informal and short term, usually established in the 
course of project negotiation. 
Table 4.10 Investment trough, November 2011–present – information 
matrix 
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career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
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5 Case studies – the solar power sector 
China’s photovoltaic (PV) industry experienced a rather unconventional development pattern. 
In just ten years it achieved what other industries had taken 20–30 years to accomplish. Its 
first PV cell production line was established in 2002 with a capacity of 15MW. PV cells were 
exported to Germany and other European countries, driven by the targets for renewable 
energy supply agreed in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which came into force in 2004. A 
Chinese solar company was listed overseas for the first time in 2005, and by 2012 China had 
been the top PV producer in the world for six consecutive years, with production capacity 
reaching 40GW, while global new installed capacity was only 31GW (EPIA 2013). The 
overcapacity in the industry was clear, resulting in financing distress within the sector. In 
2013 the entire industry went into a phase of consolidation, featuring extensive mergers and 
acquisitions. 
According to the Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development in China 2013 (Qi Ye 2013), 
there were three critical factors in the development of the PV manufacturing industry: 
technology, market and financing. The technology for solar power was, similarly to the 
development of the wind power industry, brought in from Germany, the US and other 
developed countries. The market was promising, driven by European and American demand, 
while once more local governments played an important role in financing the enterprises. 
We have selected six case studies to examine the development of China’s PV manufacturing 
industry and its domestic market, trying to find out the driving factors for the rapid 
development of the industry, its development models and the investment that made it 
possible, again drawing on the perspective of coalitions and alliances formed between 
government and the industry. 
5.1 Solar power case study 1 – early stages of Suntech 
Suntech was founded in 2001. It was China’s first company to produce solar cells 
commercially. In 2005 it was listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and its IPO 
brought in US$400m. It was China’s first PV manufacturer to be listed overseas. But from 
2011, Suntech’s fortunes declined, resulting in a debt ratio of 79 per cent by the end of that 
year (Suntech Power Holdings Co Ltd 2012).18 In March 2013, Suntech’s creditor banks 
jointly submitted an application to the Wuxi Intermediate People’s Court for the company’s 
bankruptcy, as its bank loan debt had reached 7.1bn yuan. Suntech became China’s first 
bankrupt PV manufacturer. In this case study, we focus on the role played by local 
government during the early stages of Suntech and analyse the drivers of Suntech’s rapid 
development. 
5.1.1 Major factors affecting Suntech’s initial rise 
The main stakeholders at the beginning included the company founders, the Wuxi 
municipality and seven state-owned enterprise shareholders. The role of the Wuxi 
municipality was to approach investors and convince them to invest in Suntech, and to 
coordinate the withdrawal of state capital prior to the company’s NYSE listing. The role of the 
state-owned enterprises was to commit initial investment as shareholders and provide 
guarantees for bank loans. 
 
 
                                               
18 The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, expressed as a percentage, and can be interpreted as the 
proportion of a company’s assets that are financed by debt. 
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Table 5.1 Suntech’s early stages – chronicle of financial events 
Date Event 
2001 Suntech established with initial registered capital of US$7.2m, of which the founder Shi 
Zhengronga contributed US$0.4m, and held technology sharesb of US$1.6m. 
Coordinated by the Wuxi municipality, seven state-owned enterprises invested 
US$5.2m; three of these were professional investment companies established by the 
Wuxi municipality. 
2003 State-owned shareholders provided guarantees for Suntech’s external loans. The 
chairman of the board, Li Yanren, took advantage of his political network and gained a 
low-interest loan of more than 50m yuan through the Wuxi Labor Bureau. 
2001–05 Wuxi municipality received over 11 national, provincial and city-level research 
programmes for Suntech totalling 39.2m yuan. From 2003 to 2004, Suntech obtained 
funds from nine research programmes with the help of the Wuxi municipal government. 
2005 Before Suntech was listed on the NYSE, state-owned shareholders withdrew their 
shares from Suntech with coordination from the Wuxi municipality. This was a crucial 
move for Suntech to become listed. 
Notes: a Shi was born in Yangzhong, Jiangsu province, China. After completing his undergraduate degree at Changchun 
University of Science and Technology, he gained a Master’s degree from the Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics, 
at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He then gained a doctorate degree in solar power technology at the School of 
Photovoltaic and Renewable Energy Engineering at the University of New South Wales, Australia, and acquired Australian 
citizenship. In 2001 he returned to China and set up Suntech; btechnology shares refer to contributing one’s technology as 
capital investment. 
Source: Adapted from He Yifan (2006). 
5.1.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
The key actors in this case were Suntech, the Wuxi municipal government and seven 
shareholders with a government background. 
Wuxi municipal government 
Wuxi municipal government played the role of venture capital investor, coordinator and 
director of the board. In 2001 the Wuxi municipality persuaded three government-controlled 
companies and six state-owned enterprises to commit to invest in Suntech. Eventually, 
seven out of the eight companies contributed US$5.2m in total, accounting for 72.2 per cent 
of the shares. The founder invested US$0.4m and held technology shares equivalent to 
US$1.6m, accounting for 27.8 per cent of the shares. Suntech’s state-owned shareholders 
included Wuxi Venture Capital Group, Wuxi High-tech Venture Capital Fund Managers, and 
Wuxi High-tech Venture Capital Company; all three of these were investment companies set 
up by the Wuxi municipality. 
Starting in 2004, Suntech’s founder began to plan for the withdrawal of the state-owned 
shares. He submitted a proposal to the Wuxi municipality suggesting the withdrawal of state-
owned shares from Suntech, which was supported by the party-secretary of the Wuxi 
Municipal People’s Congress Committee. The Wuxi municipality gave two principal provisos: 
firstly, in order to meet the listing requirements, state-owned shares should be withdrawn; 
secondly, the interests of all investing parties should also be met. As for the details of 
reaching a balance between these two provisos – i.e. when and how the company should 
compensate the shareholders – this was subject to agreement between the individuals 
involved. The founder began to negotiate with the shareholders and finally reached 
agreement with all of them in March 2005. Wuxi Venture Capital received the lowest return – 
still ten times as much as its initial investment (He Yifan 2006). 
Li Yanren, former director of the Economic and Trade Commission in Wuxi city, served as 
chairman of the board at Suntech from 2001 as a representative of the state-owned 
shareholders. With the withdrawal of state-owned shares, Li Yanren left Suntech in 2004. 
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The Wuxi municipal government’s priority was to develop a government investment model to 
foster high-tech enterprises. At the beginning of 2000, both central and local governments in 
China were trying to figure out how best to support high-tech companies. The Wuxi 
government was one of them. The municipality tried to create an innovative and 
entrepreneurial atmosphere for small- and medium-sized high-tech start-ups. 
Wuxi city is located in Jiangsu province, very close to Shanghai, Nanjing and Suzhou. 
Surrounded by these megacities, the Wuxi government must find a way to make its local 
economy competitive. In 2000, its government established a venture capital investment 
company, Wuxi Venture Capital Group, to invest in high-tech start-ups. At that time, Wuxi’s 
local government lacked knowledge of how to run such a company. Suntech was the first 
project that this venture capital company invested in. After Suntech, Wuxi government 
established a ‘530 Program’ in which it promised to support 30 group start-ups within five 
years. Small- and medium-sized high-tech companies could apply for support under this 
scheme. 
The Wuxi government was confronted with some major barriers when investing in Suntech: 
Difficulties in market prediction 
In 2000, China was generating too much electric power. Domestic demand was limited, so 
there was a problem of oversupply. Meanwhile, the international market was a mystery to 
Wuxi. Under such circumstances, the government sought advice from the senior technicians 
of the largest integrated-circuit chip manufacturer, China Huajing Electronics Group Co. It 
also organised a five-member team to study solar battery technologies and their production 
in Australia. 
Difficulties in fundraising 
Li Yanren, former director of the Wuxi Economic and Trade Commission, was now in charge 
of raising funds for Suntech. At first he approached private companies, but they were not 
interested. Then he went to state-owned companies. Eventually, Wuxi Venture Capital Group 
and Wuxi High-tech Venture Capital Company invested, followed by five other state-owned 
companies. US$6m was raised in total. 
Seven shareholders with state-owned background 
Seven state-owned enterprises became Suntech’s investors. In addition to Wuxi’s three 
investment companies, these were: Wuxi United Trust Company, Little Swan Group 
(manufacturer of washing machines), Mercury Group (a textile industry) and Wuxi Wo Group. 
These seven companies committed to invest with Li Yanren’s coordination. Of course, Li’s 
support for Suntech largely represented the support of the Wuxi municipal government. 
The investors’ priority in putting their money in Suntech was to provide political support for 
the government. The biggest challenge they faced was their very limited knowledge of solar 
technologies and the market. 
Suntech 
Suntech was the beneficiary and its priority was to attract investment. In October 2000, Shi 
Zhengrong, the founder of Suntech, had just arrived in Wuxi city. He presented his business 
plan to some government officials at Wuxi’s Municipal Bureau on Science and Technology, 
hoping to get investment from the municipal government. Before this time, he went through 
negotiations on cooperation with the governments of Qinhuangdao, Dalian and Shanghai. 
His proposal was rejected by Qinhuangdao and Dalian. In Shanghai, Shi Zhengrong signed 
an agreement of intent. 
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In January 2001 Wuxi’s municipal government decided to support his project. The company’s 
registered capital was US$7.2m. The Wuxi government insisted on two conditions: firstly, Shi 
Zhengrong had to invest a proportion of cash; secondly, his technology and achievements 
would all belong to the joint-venture company – he could not cooperate with anyone else for 
the same project. The result of the negotiation was that Shi Zhengrong had a 25 per cent 
shareholding, of which technology shares constituted 20 per cent, equivalent to US$1.6m, 
and cash shares were five per cent, worth US$0.4m. The seven companies with state-owned 
capital invested US$5.2m and they became the major shareholders. 
Throughout its development, Suntech encountered many challenges including lack of capital, 
market unpredictability, management barriers, etc. During its start-up phase, however, capital 
was the major constraint. Li Yanren became the chairman of the board as the representative 
of Wuxi Venture Capital Group and Shi Zhengrong was the Chief Executive Officer. During 
the start-up period, Shi Zhengrong was responsible for marketing and management while    
Li Yanren was in charge of raising the necessary capital. In early 2003 the company began 
to seek loans. Li persuaded the shareholders of four of the state-owned enterprises to 
provide the guarantee for a loan of approximately 50m yuan. After that, Li took advantage of 
his political network and gained a low-interest loan of more than 50m yuan through the Wuxi 
Labor Bureau (He Yifan 2006). 
5.1.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
Wuxi’s municipal government had informal relationships with Suntech. It secured investment 
for Suntech from seven state-owned enterprises. In terms of corporate management and 
decision-making, it participated by sending its former director of the Economic and Trade 
Commission to serve as Suntech’s chairman of the board between 2002 and 2004 after he 
retired from the government. As a retired government official, Li Yanren represented the 
interests of state-owned company shareholders. Before Suntech sought to be listed on the 
public stock market, Wuxi’s government coordinated the withdrawal of state-owned 
shareholders, and Li Yanren left Suntech. 
Table 5.2 Suntech’s early stages – information matrix 
Actor Nature of 
ownership 




















Public Local Government 
influence 
Political support Short-term, 
informal 
Low 






Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
In this case, the local government’s support for Suntech was predominantly informal except 
for the funds from research projects. Wuxi municipality did not directly invest in Suntech and 
was not one of the angel investors. Although the chairman was a retired government official 
who mobilised finance through government resources, he was not a formal representative of 
the Wuxi municipality itself. While the municipal government was coordinating the withdrawal 
of state-owned shares before the company was listed on the stock market, it only proposed 
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two guiding principles and left the negotiation to the shareholders. Nonetheless, the impact of 
the municipal government was profound. It played a very important role in the development 
of Suntech. 
5.2 Solar power case study 2 – Suntech’s foundation model 
copied by another company 
After Suntech was listed in 2005, the Wuxi government’s innovative support model became a 
hot topic in media reports. The model was copied by many municipalities in China to support 
solar companies, resulting in a rapid expansion of the industry. We selected another 
company, Canadian Solar, to analyse how the Suntech model was copied, and what the 
relationship between businesses and local government was. 




Incorporation of Canadian Solar in Canada. Factory established in Changshou, China. 
2001–04, Canadian Solar focused on small PV products, e.g. vehicle-based solar 
battery chargers. Incorporation of Canadian Solar Inc. in Canada. 
2004 Canadian Solar set up a branch in Suzhou for the production of PV cells and modules. 
1 November 
2005 
Finance secured from a private equity investor, totalling US$8.1m (HOWbuy Private 
Equity 2005). 
June 2006 Canadian Solar set up in Suzhou High-tech Zone. 
November 
2006 
Listed on NASDAQ stock exchange, becoming the second PV manufacturer listed on 
an American stock market after Suntech, and first Chinese PV manufacturer listed on 
NASDAQ. 
28 April 2009 Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration and Canadian Solar signed strategic 
cooperation agreement: Canadian Solar to increase capital and expand production, set 
up Chinese headquarters and R&D centre in Suzhou. Suzhou High-tech Zone 
Administration to support Canadian Solar to build solar power plants in its jurisdictions. 
First cooperation project was rooftop solar panels for two middle schools. Suzhou High-
tech Zone Administrative Committee to help Canadian Solar to apply for subsidies from 
governments at all levels. The Bank of Communications, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, and Bank of China signed a 15bn yuan credit support agreement with 
Canadian Solar (Zhan and Xu 2009). 
9 September 
2009 
Suzhou government issued a circular on Leap Development Program for the new 
energy industry (wind, solar PV) and three other industries. In this circular, the Suzhou 
government publicised its support for the development of the new energy industries. 
Total industrial output of solar PV industry was worth 10.6bn yuan in 2008; Suzhou 
government’s target for 2012 was 30bn yuan (i.e. roughly three times as much). 
27 May 2011 Canadian Solar signed joint-venture agreement with Suzhou High-tech Zone Economic 
Development Group Corporation and Suzhou Science and Technology Development 
City Company Limited (both wholly owned by Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration 
and Suzhou Science and Technology Town Administration). The three companies 
jointly invested US$290m to build a 600MW solar cell factory in Suzhou Science and 
Technology Town. 
5.2.1 The growth of Canadian Solar 
Prior to 2004, Canadian Solar specialised in the production of small solar products such as 
vehicle-based solar battery chargers. It built a factory in Suzhou in 2004 and began to 
produce solar cells. Its listing on the NASDAQ stock exchange was primarily driven by its 
private equity company. Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration and Canadian Solar signed a 
strategic cooperation agreement in 2009. In 2011 Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration and 
Suzhou Science and Technology Town Administration invested to help Canadian Solar 
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expand its production capacity. Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration mainly provided 
support for Canadian Solar in terms of product applications and funding. 
5.2.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
The key actors in this case included local government (Suzhou’s municipal government, 
Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration, Suzhou Science and Technology Town 
Administration) and Canadian Solar. 
Local government 
Suzhou municipality was the policymaker – crucially, in its decision to support new energy 
industries, as stated in its 2009 Leap Development Program circular, aiming in particular to 
triple the output of the PV industry within four years. Suzhou municipality had strong control 
over its subordinate units, Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration and Suzhou Science and 
Technology Town Administration, which had to find a way to achieve the target set. The 
biggest challenge for the municipality was its lack of any rational analysis of market demand, 
which meant that the target had been plucked out of the air rather than based on solid 
research. 
Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration was Canadian Solar’s strategic partner and investor, 
while Suzhou Science and Technology Town Administration was a straightforward investor. 
Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration’s priorities included supporting the development of 
high-tech enterprises and driving economic growth and local employment. 
The challenge for Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration included competition from other 
high-tech zones and towns. Suzhou is located in the Yangtze River Delta area, which covers 
Shanghai, eight cities from south-east Jiangsu province and seven cities from north-east 
Zhejiang province. The Yangtze River Delta is the region with the fastest economic growth 
and largest economic output in China. To stimulate economic growth, many cities provide 
very favourable terms to attract investors. The Suzhou municipality had to compete with its 
peers. In addition, the administration’s knowledge of the PV market was extremely limited. 
Canadian Solar 
Canadian Solar was the beneficiary. Its priorities were investment and becoming competitive. 
Affected by the continuing international financial crisis, by the beginning of 2009 China’s 
export market for solar PV products had shrunk and the cash flow of many companies was 
tight, including Canadian Solar (interview 5). In April 2009, Suzhou High-tech Zone 
Administration signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Canadian Solar, with the 
commitment to build rooftop solar power plants using Canadian Solar’s products, and to 
provide loan credit of 15bn yuan. This helped Canadian Solar to survive through a difficult 
period. 
In 2011, Canadian Solar invested more capital to expand production when itself, Suzhou 
High-tech Zone Economic Development Group Corporation and Suzhou Science and 
Technology Town Development City Company jointly invested US$290m. The biggest risk 
for Canadian Solar was its blind confidence in the international market. The company was 
still expanding in 2011, and in 2012 it experienced financial difficulties. 
5.2.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
There was a long-term, formal relationship between Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration 
and Canadian Solar as they signed their strategic cooperation agreement in April 2009. In 
this agreement, Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration promised to support Canadian Solar, 
while Canadian Solar promised to increase capital investment and expand production, and 
set up headquarters in China and an R&D centre in Suzhou. A strategic partnership like this 
is reciprocal. The local government helped Canadian Solar to gain finance from banks and 
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itself became an investor, while Canadian Solar’s expansion was expected to increase 
employment and tax revenue. The R&D centre was expected to enhance R&D capacity 
overall in Suzhou. These were priorities for the local government. This strategic cooperation 
is a long-term and formal partnership. 
Table 5.4 Canadian Solar – information matrix 
Actor Nature of 
ownership 

















































Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
5.3 Solar power case study 3 – sharp investment growth before 
financial crisis 
Between December 2005 and August 2007, ten Chinese PV manufacturers were listed on 
overseas stock exchanges, raising a total of US$2.082bn. How did this financing peak 
happen? What mechanism drove such a huge amount of investment? 
5.3.1 Major driving factors of the investment peak 
The primary capital that drove Chinese PV manufacturers’ listings came from internationally 
renowned venture companies. During this period, a large amount of international venture 
capital rushed into China, and the PV industry became a hotspot for investment. Most of 
these venture companies were listed overseas (interview 1). At the same time, Chinese local 









Table 5.5 PV manufacturer stock market listings, December 2005–August 
2007 
Date PV manufacturer Exchange market Capital raised (US$m) 
14 December 2005 Suntech (STP) NYSE 342.3 
8 August 2006 ReneSola Ltd. (SOL) LSE (AIM) 50 
9 November 2006 Canadian Solar (CSIQ) NASDAQ 107.8 
18 December 2006 Trina Solar (TSL) NASDAQ 150 
19 December 2006 Trina Solar (TSL) NYSE 98 
21 December 2006 Solarfun Power (SOLF) NASDAQ 150 
7 February 2007 JA Solar (JASO) NASDAQ 240 
17 May 2007 China Sunergy (CSUN) NASDAQ 93.5 
1 June 2007 LDK Solar (LDK) NYSE 469.368 
8 June 2007 Yingli Solar (YGE) NYSE 319 
6 July 2007 Jetion Solar (JHL) LSE (AIM) 62.13 
Notes: LSE: London Stock Exchange; NASDAQ – based in US and Europe. 
Source: Adapted from Chinaventure (2007). 
5.3.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
The key actors in this case included venture capital/private equity (VC/PE) agents, local 
governments and PV manufacturers. 
Venture capital/private equity agents 
In this case, VC/PE agents played the role of investor. Their priority was financial rewards. 
Investing in a PV manufacturer and helping it to get listed on the overseas stock market 
during this period (December 2005–August 2007) normally brought a profit more than five 
times its initial investment – at least. For example, Goldman Sachs invested US$25m in 
Suntech in 2005 (China Business Herald Net 2007). When Suntech was listed on the NYSE, 
the opening price surged to US$20.35 per share, so Goldman Sachs’ investment became 
US$400m, translating into a profit of 16 times its initial investment. 
Local governments 
Local governments have played the roles of coordinator and lender. The priority of local 
governments is economic growth and local employment. Overseas listings benefited local 
governments in three ways (interview 6): 
Most companies seeking to be listed would begin by registering a new company in the Virgin 
Islands or the Cayman Islands, serving as the institution to be listed. This meant that the 
financing of these companies could be categorised as ‘foreign investment’ and so be 
accounted by the local government as ‘attracting foreign investment work’ in that year. 
After gaining funding, the listed companies would generally use most of the money to expand 
production capacity, which could be accounted as an achievement of ‘fixed asset investment’ 
by the local government. 
When companies received funding through public financing for the needed production 
capacity expansion, local governments no longer had to seek out funds for the companies 
(Yingli Solar 2007). With such incentives, the local government fully supported the listing. 
In the case of Suntech, in order to ensure listing, the local government coordinated the 
withdrawal of the state-owned shareholders prior to it taking place. For the listing of Yingli 
Solar, local government played the role of coordinator and borrower. Before Yingli was listed 
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in 2007, state-owned shareholders held 51 per cent of the shares, while the founder held    
49 per cent. Under the coordination of the local government, state-owned shareholders 
agreed to sell two per cent of the shares, and their share fell from 51 per cent to 49 per cent. 
This was necessary for Yingli to register a company overseas and become listed. In addition, 
Yingli’s capital was very tight prior to listing, when the Baoding High-tech Zone government 
secured two loans of US$30m and US$42m respectively (interview 6). 
The constraints for local government were its officials’ knowledge that their performance 
would be judged according to how much the local economy had grown, and their ignorance 
of the PV industry and market. Economic growth was a crucial factor when the performance 
of local officials was evaluated, and investment was in turn a key measure of economic 
growth. Driven by a desire to excel in economic growth-based performance evaluation, the 
listing of PV manufacturers received full support from local governments. 
PV manufacturers 
PV manufacturers were the beneficiaries. Their priorities were finding new sources of finance 
and becoming established producers and brands. Their main constraint was ignorance of the 
risks of being publicly listed on the stock market. In 2007, LDK Solar’s stock price tumbled 
because its financial problems were exposed after it listed. In 2012, many listed companies 
received delisting warnings from the NYSE and suffered a crisis of credibility. 
5.3.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
There was an informal partnership between local governments and PV manufacturers. For 
the listing of a number of companies, local government played the role of coordinator and 
lender. In the withdrawal of state capital, public statements by top officials of the local 
government empowered the founder’s negotiation, or negotiation was directly assisted by 
local officials. Local government officials took advantage of their influence on state-owned 
enterprises. In Yingli’s case, the local government secured loans by lending money to Yingli 
from its subsidiary companies. These are all examples of informal cooperation and voluntary 
support from local governments to help the enterprise to be listed on the stock market; such 
support played a very important role. 
5.4 Solar power case study 4 – sharp investment growth during 
financial crisis 
In 2010 there was a sharp peak in investment in the PV industry. As shown in Figure 5.1, the 
largest part was from corporate debt. In 2009, 2010 and 2011, the total amount of corporate 
debt was US$772m, US$23,248m and US$1,443m respectively, and the ratio of corporate 
debt to total financing was 24.2 per cent, 77.6 per cent, and 8.2 per cent (BNEF 2014). In 
2009 and 2010, the proportion of debt financing for PV companies increased significantly, 
reaching 77.6 per cent of total financing in 2010. In this period, there was also an investment 
peak in the wind power industry (see wind power case study 4.3). What was the main source 
of corporate debt? And what were the drivers for this sharp investment growth during the 
financial crisis? 
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Figure 5.1 Solar PV financing 2008–12 
Notes: Mergers and acquisitions: the value of existing equity purchased by new corporate buyers in companies developing 
renewable technology or operating renewable energy projects; public markets: all money investment in the equity of publicly 
quoted companies developing renewable energy technology and clean power generation. 
Source: Based on data from BNEF (2014). 
5.4.1 Major drivers for the investment peak in 2010 
The main source of funding for the investment peak in 2010 was bank loans, which had been 
the main financing channel for Chinese PV companies since 2008. The stimulus package 
planned in 2009 and launched in 2010 by the Chinese central government listed the new 
energy industry, including PV manufacturing, as one of the ‘seven strategically important and 
emerging industries’. Banks were encouraged to give financial support to these industries 
from 2009. The CDB played an important role. 
5.4.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
The key actors in this case included central government (State Council, NDRC, NEA, MIIT), 
the CDB and other state-owned banks, local government and PV manufacturers. 
Central government 
Central government played the role of policymaker. The priorities of central government 
included seeking new economic growth, creating jobs, industrial restructuring and upgrading, 
speeding up the transformation of China’s model of economic growth, and building 
international competitive advantage (State Council 2010). 
At this time the central government also faced many challenges including the financial crisis, 
economic stagnation, unemployment, etc. However, the most important one for this case 
study was the government’s lack of knowledge about the PV industry and market risks. By 
2010, PV factories were established in many places in China and the PV industry already 
had overcapacity, yet the central government encouraged the banks to lend PV 
manufacturers more money to expand further. 
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Table 5.6 Investment peak in PV industry, 2010 – chronicle of events 
Date Event 
September 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao held three symposiums on the development of ‘strategically 
important and emerging industries’. 
3 November 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao gave a speech on ‘let science and technology lead China’s 
sustainable development’ at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, mentioning that 
China had a comparative advantage and broad space for developing strategically 
important and emerging industries. 
2009 At the end of 2009, CDB met with top officials of NEA, NDRC and MIIT, and 
signed cooperation memos with each of them. The bank was also invited to draft 
the State Council’s ‘Decision on Cultivating and Developing Strategically Important 
and Emerging Industries’ and it introduced the ‘Guidelines of Solar Power 
Development Project Evaluation’. 
10 October 2010 State Council promulgated its ‘Decision on Cultivating and Developing 
Strategically Important and Emerging Industries’. The industries were: energy 
conservation and environment protection, new energy, new generation information 
technology, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new materials, and 
new-energy vehicles. The target for each industry was to reach global level within 
20 years. A special fund was set up to support their development. The government 
encouraged financial institutions to lend more money to these industries. 
2010 CDB offered credit lines worth US$43.6bn to Chinese renewable energy 
manufacturing companies. Loan guarantees worth US$32.5bn were extended to 
the solar industry alone (Jackson 2011). 
China Development Bank and other state-owned commercial banks 
The China Development Bank was both policymaker and implementer in China’s support for 
strategically important and emerging industries. As discussed in Section 4, the CDB’s 
mission is to provide medium and long-term credit in order to implement the country’s 
medium and long-term national economic development strategies. In this particular case, the 
bank’s priority was to help implement national strategies for the strategically important and 
emerging industries as defined by the central government. To this end, it worked with the 
NEA, NDRC and MIIT, helped to write the State Council’s ‘Decision on Cultivating and 
Developing Strategically Important and Emerging Industries’ (interview 7), produced its own 
guidelines for evaluating solar power development projects, and started to provide loans for 
the PV industry. CDB’s strong support for the industry also encouraged other state-owned 
banks to offer loans for solar projects. 
The priority for other major state-owned commercial banks was to pursue financial rewards. 
During 2008/09, many countries implemented economic stimulus plans in response to the 
global recession, leading to a boom in overseas markets for PV products. Companies’ net 
profits exceeded 20 per cent during that time. Driven by expectations of high profits, the 
banks provided much financial support to the industry. Suntech, for example, was pursued by 
sales staff from many banks and substantial loans were offered (interview 8). 
The constraints faced by the CDB and the other state-owned commercial banks included 
their lack of knowledge about the risks, market variation, technology, and production capacity 
of investing in the PV industry. 
Local governments 
When applying for loans from the CDB, local governments were partners with PV companies. 
Before 2002 the CDB only lent to state-owned companies. In 1998 Yingli wanted to apply for 
a 20m yuan loan, but as a private company it was not eligible to obtain loans from the CDB. 
The government of Baoding High-tech Zone arranged for one of its subsidiary state-owned 
enterprises to invest and bought 60 per cent of Yingli’s shares. Then the government 
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succeeded in applying for a loan for Yingli from the CDB. After 2002, although the bank’s 
loans were accessible to the private sector, they still required a lot of evidence from the local 
governments. When companies were applying for CDB loans, there was an alliance between 
local governments and the solar power industry. 
PV manufacturers 
PV manufacturers were the beneficiaries. Their priorities were gaining finance and 
competitiveness. The challenge for them was that financing resources were not equally 
distributed. It was much easier for big, well-known enterprises to gain bank loans, while 
small- and medium-sized enterprises usually encountered difficulties in borrowing money 
from the banks. 
5.4.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
There was no established coalition between the central government, and the CDB and the 
other state-owned commercial banks. CDB is one of China’s policy banks and is a subsidiary 
of the central government. State-owned commercial banks are usually also influenced by 
central government’s decisions. By nature, they are not fully ‘commercial’ banks. The 
presidents of these banks are appointed by central government, and they are sometimes 
government officials themselves. However, these state-owned commercial banks are also 
listing enterprises; their priority is pursuing profit. 
Table 5.7 Sharp investment growth during financial crisis, 2010 – 
information matrix 
Actor Nature of 
ownership 
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Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
When a PV manufacturer was applying for a loan from the CDB, short-term, informal 
cooperation was established between the manufacturer and its local government. 
Enterprises could not gain CDB loans by themselves, so local government stepped in and 
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provided assistance. This coalition remained short term and informal, as agreements were 
mostly made on a personal level between managers and government officials. 
5.5 Solar power case study 5 – introduction of PV feed-in tariff 
(FIT) in 2011 
China’s domestic PV market was inactive for a long time. In 2010, new installed capacity was 
only 0.5GW, while PV production reached 9GW in that year. The NEA conducted the first 
concession tender for solar generation projects in 2009 and the second tender in 2010; the 
third was planned for 2011. Then in 2011 the NDRC introduced the FIT for solar-generated 
electricity. What were the major drivers of introducing this? This study examines them from 
the perspective of coalitions and alliances. 
5.5.1 Major drivers of enacting the FIT 
Local government played a very important role in the introduction of the FIT. As a result of 
the 2008 international financial crisis, China’s PV sales overseas were falling and solar 
companies were in trouble. In order to help their local PV manufacturers, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang provinces both introduced their own FITs. Ningxia also secured FIT rates for its four 
solar power plants approved by the NDRC in 2010. In 2011, Qinghai approved many solar 
power plants in its jurisdiction and started to lobby the commission to set a national FIT. 
Table 5.8 Actions of local government concerning FIT, 2009–11 
Date Actions of local government 
19 June 2009 Provincial FIT in Jiangsu province issued by Jiangsu provincial DRC.a 
July 2009 Qinghai provincial governor lobbied NDRC for approval of FIT to kick-start 
province’s PV industry, but it cost local government 1bn per year to subsidise. 
2 April 2010 Four PV plants in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region approved with temporary FIT by 
NDRC, which meant the cost of subsidy would be shared by electricity consumers in 
China. This activity was seen as the result of successful lobbying of NDRC by the 
provincial government. 
21 June 2010 Provincial FIT in Shandong province issued by Shandong provincial DRC. 
July 2011 Qinghai provincial governor lobbied NDRC for unified FIT so cost of subsidy would 
be shared by electricity consumers across China. 
Notes: a DRC: Development and Reform Commission, Department for Economy and Development Policymaking. 
5.5.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
In this case study, the key actors included central government (NDRC), local government 
(Qinghai province, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Shandong province, Jiangsu province) 
and PV manufacturers. 
Central government 
The price department of the NDRC was responsible for setting the price of electricity, 
including FITs for solar power. Provincial governments did not have the power to set prices; 
they could propose a provincial FIT, which was subject to approval by the commission. 
The NDRC’s priority was to develop wind power. It costs more to generate electricity from 
solar energy than wind, so since 2000 the government had focused on the latter. Although 
PV manufacturers had called for support for the domestic market for many years, their 
influence on central government’s policymaking was limited. 
The challenge for the commission was the higher cost of PV generation compared to wind 
and biomass. The total amount of the renewable energy fund was approximately 20bn yuan 
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in 2012. In that year the FIT for wind power ranged from 0.51 to 0.61 yuan/kWh, about     
0.75 yuan/kWh for biomass, and 1 yuan/kWh for solar. With a limited sum available as 
subsidy, the commission preferred to support wind as that way it got more power for each 
yuan spent. 
Local government 
Local government was the lobbyist and also the manufacturers’ partner. Its priority here was 
to provide political support for its local manufacturers. 
Through supporting its PV manufacturers, local government became a partner that they 
could rely on. When overseas markets shrank after the 2008 financial crisis, local 
government protected its PV industry by lobbying central government and setting local FIT 
policies – e.g. Jiangsu and Shandong introduced a local FIT. However, economic stimulus 
plans across the world soon restored international market demand (by the second half of 
2009). While pursuing a high profit margin in international markets, China’s PV industry was 
not very interested in developing solar plants domestically, so the local FIT policy did not 
really benefit the PV industry. 
In the introduction of a national FIT for solar generation, local governments were the 
lobbyists. PV sales experienced a major decrease because of overproduction in China and 
the decreasing market overseas because many countries had cut their subsidies for solar 
energy. This drove the solar industry to push for an expansion of the Chinese domestic 
market. Qinghai province in western China, which is rich in solar resource, approved more 
than 800MW of solar power projects. In May 2011, Qinghai’s party-secretary and governor 
travelled to Beijing to meet the director of the NDRC to discuss the FIT. According to 
‘Geermu City People’s Government Meeting Minutes – PV Projects Symposia’ dated 27 May 
2011, the director agreed to give Qinghai special support for its tariff, namely 1.15 yuan/kWh 
for all solar plants that were constructed and connected to the grid by 30 September 2011 
(Xie Dan 2011). On 24 July 2011, the NDRC formally issued its ‘Notice on Improving Solar 
Feed-in Tariff Policies’. 
Figure 5.2 How pressure was transferred to the NDRC 
 
Source: Authors’ own. 
The challenge for local government included the fact that it did not have the power to set the 
price of electricity and its inability to subsidise large-scale solar projects. On prices, it had to 
gain approval from the NDRC, so it was powerless to stimulate the local market for solar 
energy. This meant that local government was not able to help PV manufacturers directly. 
Moreover, local government in western China was comparatively underdeveloped and did 
not have enough revenue by itself to subsidise large-scale deployment. For example, the 
subsidy Qinghai needed in 2009 for PV power was approximately 1bn yuan, while its total 
revenue was only about 16.6bn yuan (Qi Ye 2013). 
PV manufacturers 
PV manufacturers were the beneficiaries and their priority was to win support for sales in the 
domestic market. Their challenge was over-dependency on the overseas market. Overseas 
sales accounted for about 90 per cent of all sales of China’s solar industry until 2011 (Fan 
2012). Every time that global market demand decreased, PV manufacturers had to deal with 
the excess products left in stock. This time, they turned to local government for support. 
PV manufacturers Local governments NDRC 
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When the financial crisis affected PV policies in European countries in 2009, PV 
manufacturers in Jiangsu province sought protection from the local government. The 
governor of Jiangsu negotiated with the NDRC and finally issued the first local FIT for solar 
generation in China. 
5.5.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
Provincial governments and PV manufacturers had a long-term informal relationship. 
Supported by local government, several PV manufacturers became leading enterprises in 
their city or province, and their presidents usually had good personal relationships with 
government officials so they could lobby local government effectively. On the other hand, 
local government was enthusiastic to support solar enterprises as they could greatly 
contribute to revenue, employment, etc. During the expansion of the PV industry, local 
government became the spokesperson for their interests. The relationship between 
manufacturers and government officials was personal, while the relationship between local 
and central government was defined by political hierarchy. 
Table 5.9 Introduction of PV FIT in 2011 – information matrix 
Actor Nature of 
ownership 
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Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
5.6 Solar power case study 6 – rescue of LDK Solar 
A media report in July 2012 about Xinyu municipality’s plans to help pay off LDK Solar’s 
debts with public money attracted widespread attention. The legality of such a plan was 
heatedly discussed. This was a typical case of local government trying to help PV 
manufacturers at all costs. The intensive and unprecedented public attention and controversy 
finally compelled the municipality to give up its plan. This case study analyses the factors 
that influence local government behaviour when it decides to invest public money in a private 
solar energy company. 
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5.6.1 Major influencing factors in the case of LDK Solar 
The major stakeholders were Xinyu municipality, Jiangxi provincial government, the public 
and LDK Solar. Beginning in January 2012, Jiangxi provincial government and Xinyu 
municipality had been busy making plans to help LDK survive its financial crisis. Media 
reports sparked public concern and the public started to act as watchdogs of the local 
government. 
Table 5.10 Local governments’ rescue activities 
Date Financing activities by local government 
January 2012 Xinyu government lent 200m yuan to LDK Solar. 
2 May 2012 Jiangxi provincial government established ‘LDK Solar Stable Development Fund’ 
and provided a loan of 2bn yuan to LDK from this. 
12 July 2012 Xinyu government planned to allocate 755m yuan from public revenue to pay back 
LDK’s debt (abandoned due to intense public concern). 
22 October 2012 Jiangxi Hengrui New Energy Company (a new company established to save LDK, 
with 40% of its shares owned by Xinyu government) purchased 19.9% of LDK’s 
global share at a price of US$0.86 per share, investing US$23m in total. 
Sources: Adapted from Guo Lifang (2012) and Jiang Zhuoying (2012). 
5.6.2 Key actors, roles, priorities and challenges 
Key actors in this case included local government (Jiangxi provincial government, Xinyu 
municipality), LDK Solar, the mass media and the public. 
Local government 
Local government played the roles of lender and investor. When LDK Solar could not gain 
any funding from the market, local government transferred funds directly to LDK to clear its 
debts. The continuous decline of its stock price meant the company was at risk of being 
delisted, so the local government tried to buy LDK shares through its holding company in 
order to prevent this. 
The priority of local government changed from economic growth to simply maintaining 
employment and social stability. Their top concern was that LDK Solar employed more than 
24,000 people. If it went bankrupt, many people would lose their jobs, with the potential of 
social turmoil. Secondly, LDK was a giant enterprise which made a significant contribution to 
local development. For example, the net income of LDK Solar was US$609m in 2011 – a 
slump year – yet it still paid 1.36bn yuan (US$210m) tax to the municipal government. 
The challenges for local government were its limited sources of finance and being open to 
public questioning. By 31 December 2012, LDK Solar’s total liabilities were US$5.4bn, while 
the total revenue of Xinyu city in 2011 was only US$1.72bn (11.1bn yuan) (Xinyu Municipal 
Finance Bureau 2012). Xinyu municipality obviously did not have the financial capacity to 
save LDK from its enormous debts. 
Nowadays, the internet has become a means for the public to express their opinions, 
question and criticise, with the power to change the behaviour of central and local 
governments. In China, local government officials are appointed by central government, 
while public criticism is a very important factor by which to evaluate their performance. So 




LDK Solar was the beneficiary. The priority of LDK Solar was to pay back its debts and 
survive. In 2012, LDK Solar trimmed its staff, reduced production, sold assets (including 
three large rooftop plants, and 100 per cent of its shares in two subsidiaries: LDK Nanchang 
and LDK Anhui), and found two large strategic investors to pay its debts. 
The main challenge for LDK Solar was limited sources of finance. Bank loans, the stock 
market and bonds were the most important financing channels for LDK Solar from 2007 to 
2011, but these were all blocked in 2012. In the third quarter of 2012, LDK Solar received a 
delisting warning from the NYSE because the share price had fallen below US$1 for 30 
consecutive days. Subsequently, LDK’s share price lingered below US$2. There was no new 
bank loan on offer. In April 2013, LDK announced partial non-payment of its convertible 
senior notes due in 2013 (LDK Solar Company Limited 2013).19 
The only sources of finance left for LDK Solar were equity financing or to borrow from the 
government. In 2012, LDK borrowed 2bn yuan from Jiangxi provincial government and 0.2bn 
yuan from Xinyu municipality. In 2012 and 2013, LDK Solar gained two big investors with 
government background and secured US$47.5m from them. However, compared with its 
US$5.4bn debts, the investment was far from sufficient. 
Mass media and the public 
The mass media and the public played the role of watchdogs. Their priority was to keep a 
watch on the local government. Media watchdogs have become increasingly important in 
China, while the public are also paying closer attention to government behaviour. Xinyu 
government’s decision to use 755m yuan of public money to pay LDK’s debts was all over 
the media in the following days and evoked high concerns and debates among the public. 
They questioned the legality of using public revenue to pay the debts of a private enterprise 
(Dong and Guo 2012). Due to the intense public concern, notice of the decision was 
removed from the government website and eventually the decision itself was revoked. The 
main challenge for the media and the public was that China still lacked legal and diversified 
channels for them to participate in the policymaking process. 
5.6.3 Nature of engagement and relationship with other stakeholders 
LDK Solar and Xinyu city government had a long-term informal relationship. For example, the 
mayor of Xinyu used to work onsite at LDK Solar one day per month during its set-up phase. 
LDK’s founder, Peng Xiaofeng, was also vice president of the Commercial and Industrial 
Association of Jiangxi province, and a member of the standing committee of the Xinyu 
People’s Political Consultative Conference. These positions gave him the right to submit 
proposals to the government and to negotiate with the government locally. Its support was 
crucial to LDK Solar: in 2012 all the capital LDK received from financing activities was 
guaranteed by the local government. 
 
                                               
19 Convertible senior notes: a debt security that contains an option where the note will be converted into a predefined amount of 
the issuer’s shares. A convertible senior note has priority over all other debt securities issued by the same organisation. 
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Table 5.11 Rescue of LDK solar – information matrix 
Actor Nature of 
ownership 
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Notes: a e.g. climate change, energy security, competitiveness, job creation; b e.g. financial rewards, political support, 
career/status advancement; c e.g. long-term/strategic vs. short-term/tactical; d high/medium/low. 
 
5.7 Summary of PV case studies 
From these PV case studies we can conclude the following: 
There was a long-term coalition, informal or formal (usually the former) between local 
government and PV manufacturers. The alliance was formed during long-term support for its 
PV manufacturing industry by local government. Presidents of such enterprises and local 
government officials usually had very good personal relationships, which helped enterprises 
lobby local government successfully. The senior executives usually also held positions in 
industrial associations and the People’s Political Consultative Conference, which enabled 
them to appeal to local government through formal, legal channels as well. 
Local government officials could be judged as performing well in their jobs if they helped to 
develop strong PV companies in their area, hence they had consistent interests with solar 
companies. That was a key reason why local government would help solar companies to 
secure finance or lobby central government for policies favourable to them. 
Local governments played multiple roles in the financing activities for PV manufacturing 
enterprises. They acted as the coordinator for getting loans from banks, as direct lenders 
themselves, as coordinators to support the listing of these companies, as venture capital 
investors, and as lenders and investors to help companies weather their financial crises. 




6 Key findings 
6.1 Primary drivers 
The primary drivers of investment for wind and solar energy in China were different. In the 
development of both the wind turbine and PV industries, the Chinese central government 
played the most vital role. However, there was still a difference. For wind, the turbine 
manufacturing industry was primarily driven by the surging domestic market demand 
stimulated by central government’s policies, while wind farms were driven both by central 
government’s policies and local government support. For the solar power sector, PV 
manufacturing industry expansion was primarily driven by local government, while solar 
plants or farms were driven by central government (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Primary drivers of investment in wind and solar energy in 
China 
 Primary drivers 
Wind manufacture industry Domestic market demand stimulated by central government’s 
policies. 
Wind farm development Central government’s policies and local governments’ support. 
PV manufacture industry Overseas market demand and local governments’ support. 
PV deployment within China Central government’s support for PV manufacturing industry. 
For the wind turbine industry, surging domestic market demand was the main driver of its 
development. Chinese wind turbine manufacturers mostly evolved from state-owned 
institutions or state-owned manufacturing enterprises, whose initial impetus for the 
transformation was to seek profit and growth (see Section 4.1, Goldwind Science & 
Technology). From 2003, China’s central government enacted a series of policies to boost 
domestic demand for wind generation, which provided incentives for many state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises to transform into wind turbine manufacturers. 
The development of wind farms was driven by two factors: firstly, the series of policies 
conducted by the central government to expand domestic market demand, such as the 
‘concession tenders’; then secondly, the approval rights held by local government for wind 
farms between 2005 and 2011 when a large number of projects were set up (see Sections 
4.1 and 4.2). In 2007, for example, all 72 wind farms constructed had an installed capacity of 
less than 50MW, a capacity threshold that only needed the approval of local government   
(Qi Ye 2011). 
Investment for the PV manufacturing industry was also mainly driven by just two factors: 
firstly, the growing international market demand. It was evident that investment rushed into 
the PV manufacturing industry in China after the German-based European market demand 
took off in 2004. The second factor was the financial support of local government (see 
Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6). Around 2007, more than 100 cities in China built a PV industrial 
park, accounting for about one-sixth of all cities in the country (He Yong 2011). 
The main driver of China’s support for the domestic PV market was a desire to support the 
manufacturing industry and manage its overcapacity. Affected by overcapacity and trade 
wars, PV manufacturers encountered a difficult time after 2011. To save the industry, the 
central government enacted a feed-in tariff (FIT) to stimulate the domestic market in 
response to the lobbying of local governments and PV manufacturers (see Section 5.5). 
During 2012 and 2013 the US and Europe launched anti-dumping and anti-subsidy policies 
against China’s PV products, which was a devastating blow to China’s PV industry.  
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In response, the central government introduced a number of policies to encourage the rapid 
expansion of PV generation within China itself. For example, the central government set the 
target of installing 10GW in 2013 (actual installed capacity reached 13GW) and 14GW in 
2014. 
Wind investment was conducted in a typical government-led approach, characterised as 
follows: 
Central government played the most vital role in promoting both manufacturing and 
deployment in China. It adopted two policy instruments – renewable energy quotas and the 
FIT – which equipped large energy corporations with both obligation and motivation to 
expand wind generation. The central government also encouraged banks to provide loans to 
enterprises engaged in wind and other renewable energy development. 
Main players in the wind power sector were either state-owned enterprises or corporations 
with governmental backgrounds. For example, state-owned enterprises were the major 
developers, and state-owned banks were the major lenders. At the early stage of 
development, state-owned policy banks provided funds for wind manufacturers and 
developers; other state-owned commercial banks also increased their level of support 
towards the wind industry as the national policy signal was very clear. 
Local governments adopted the ‘exchange local resources for development’ strategy, 
supporting wind farm projects for the purpose of developing the local wind manufacture 
industry or using local products (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Dynamics in the wind sector 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013). 
The development of the PV industry in China can be divided into three phases according to 
its financing characteristics (Figure 6.2). During the initial cultivating phase from 1998 to 
2004, local governments played the most vital role in helping PV manufacturers get financed. 
In the second phase, 2005–11, capital from banks, stock markets, VC/PE and the bond 
market flooded into the PV industry, attracted by expectations of high profits, and the industry 
absorbed a large amount of investment in a relatively short time. The third phase started in 
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2012, when capital left the industry and it experienced decreasing profits and trade wars. In 
this phase, local government reached out to help manufacturers solve their financing 
problems, while the central government started to stimulate the domestic PV market by 
encouraging solar generation within China itself. 
Figure 6.2 Dynamics in the PV sector 
Source: Adapted from Qi Ye (2013). 
6.2 Key characteristics of coalitions 
Close coalitions were found in investment for both wind and solar energy in China. In the 
development of the wind turbine industry, wind turbine manufacturers, the government, grid 
companies and wind farm developers (large state-owned energy companies) together 
constituted the developers, implementers and beneficiaries of the wind farm concession 
tender policies (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). For wind farms, developers not only participated 
in concession tender policymaking and implementation, but also formed a close alliance with 
local government during the actual development process (see Section 4.2). In the 
development of the PV manufacturing industry, PV companies and local governments 
formed long-term and stable cooperative relationships (see Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.6). For 
the use of PV products within China, the industry worked together with local government in 
lobbying for FITs (see Section 5.5). 
The development of wind and solar farms in China far exceeded the country’s planning 
objectives – policy alone could not have resulted in such rapid development of wind and 
solar energy. This also indicates the existence of a coalition mechanism. The targets for 
2010 set by the 2007 ‘Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in 
China’ were for cumulative installed capacity of 5GW for wind and 300MW for solar, yet the 
actual installed capacity reached 44.7GW and 900MW respectively. 
Such coalitions were formed by mutual interest and actions. For the wind concession tender 
policy, governments, manufacturers, developers and grid companies jointly developed and 
revised the policy (see Section 4.2). In wind and solar energy resource development, local 
government pursued developers for its purposes. In supporting the development of PV 
enterprises, local government adopted various instruments in their support, while enterprises 
actively went to local government for help (see Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.5). In stimulating the 
use of PV within China, both manufacturers and local governments actively lobbied for the 
introduction of the FIT (see Section 5.5). 
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Another feature of these coalitions was the bond formed through/despite different interests. 
Each party had their own interests, yet they could be achieved through the same action. For 
example, in solar energy case study 5.2, the expansion plan proposed by Canadian Solar 
was supported by Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration and Suzhou Science and 
Technology Town Administration, which provided investment through a government-affiliated 
investment company. The expansion was expected to serve the company’s goals of reducing 
production costs, as well as the local government’s goal of increasing the value of its 2012 
PV industry output to 30bn yuan. In this case, the interests of Canadian Solar and the 
Suzhou government were not the same, but the expansion was expected to enable them 
both to achieve their different goals. 
The coalition relationships lasted different periods of time for wind and solar. For wind energy 
investment, the coalition was a short-term relationship. In the development and 
implementation of wind concession tender policy, the validity period of the coalition 
relationship was the same as the policy cycle. In local wind resource development, the 
relationship lasted as long as the development and construction phase of wind farms – once 
they were built and in operation, the relationship between developers and local government 
also came to an end. For investment in solar energy, local government and PV companies 
formed longer-standing coalitions. Solar energy case studies 5.1 and 5.6 showed that these 
coalitions were established with the foundation of the company and lasted until the present. 
They relied heavily on personal relationships between government officials and business 
leaders, yet even when government officials were replaced, the new officer would generally 
seek to maintain such relationships for the consideration of both public and personal 
interests (interview 6). 
The alliances formed in the wind and solar industries were both formal and informal. In the 
development and implementation of wind concession tender policy, the relationship was 
informal. During the development of local wind power resources, alliances between local 
government and the wind farm developers were formalised by a series of signed contracts, 
including wind resource development agreements. In the local government’s support for PV 
companies, there were both formal and informal coalitions. In solar case studies 5.1 and 5.6, 
although support from local government was significant for PV enterprises, the coalition was 
informal as no agreement was signed. In these cases its strength depended on personal 
relationships between government officials and business leaders. In PV case study 5.2, 
Suzhou High-tech Zone Administration and Canadian Solar signed a strategic cooperation 
agreement, formalising their alliance. In PV product applications, the coalition between 
manufacturers and the central government was informal, as the latter did not directly support 
the industry but stimulated the market while leaving competition to the PV companies. 
The coalition relationships described here were also generally local and only within China. 
Coalition relationships based on an alignment of interests existed within national boundaries 
for wind energy investment, and remained more narrowly local for solar industry 
development. In recent years, as China’s turbine manufacturing industry is expanding its 
exports and the China Export-Import Bank and other banks are providing financial 
assistance, the formation of coalitions and alliances has tended to expand to the international 
arena. 
6.3 Coalition forms and bundling tactics 
Factors influencing investment behaviour in China’s wind and solar energy sectors were 
different (Table 6.2). Most turbine manufacturers evolved from state-owned manufacturing 
enterprises which faced the challenge of surviving by developing new products. Hence, for 
them, the decisive factor for investment was market demand and expected profit. Wind and 
solar farm developers were mostly large state-owned energy enterprises, who had quasi-
monopoly resource access and did not need to worry about survival as much as those state-
owned manufacturing enterprises. As a result, for them, the decisive factor for investment 
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was the renewable energy quota imposed on them around 2007. In addition, these energy 
companies competed for market share and drove the rush for seizing wind resources after 
2007. For them, profit was an important factor, but not the most important one. As for PV 
manufacturers, who were mostly private enterprises, their top concerns were firstly profit, 
then support from local governments. In conclusion, investors in different sectors had 
different backgrounds and mentalities, and factors that influenced their investment decisions 
also differed. 
Table 6.2 Key determinants of investors’ decisions 
Investors Key determinants of investment decisions 
Wind manufacturers Domestic market demand, profit 
Wind power developers Renewable quota, market share, profit 
PV manufacturers Profit, local government’s support 
PV developers State-owned enterprises: market share, profit; PV manufacturers: 
absorption of production 
A coalition was formed between stakeholders with different yet related interests. This was the 
most important rationale to forming a coalition or alliance – the stakeholders had different 
interests, but ones that they expected to further through the same action. It is also worth 
noticing that each stakeholder in a coalition had significant resources and the capacity to 
allocate them so that such relationships could be formed. For example, for wind energy 
development, the central government successfully involved different stakeholders. Each 
player had their interests and resources that motivated and enabled them to participate and 
each played a role. With the aligned participation of different players, a coalition was formed 
to promote investment in wind energy development (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3 Interests and resources of major players for wind energy 
investment 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Project developers with a state-owned background were motivated by three factors: the 
renewable energy quota, market share and profit. In addition, state-owned energy companies 
also had a strong negotiating position and sufficient financial capacity to empower them to 
seize huge market share. These companies were already high-profile enterprises that local 
governments wanted to attract, and credible borrowers that banks were happy to pursue. 
They had unparalleled advantages in the competition for the wind power market. 
State-owned commercial banks were the major lenders for investment in wind energy. The 
central government sent out clear signals about its long-term support for renewable energy 
development through its Renewable Energy Law and other matching policies, and banks 
were encouraged to provide preferential bank loans to enterprises engaged in wind energy 
development. On the one hand, state-owned energy companies had strong guarantee 
capacities and a high credit rating, plus (behind the scenes) government back-up to meet the 
banks’ preference for low-risk and long-term loans. On the other hand, state-owned energy 
companies have long-term cooperation with state-owned commercial banks. In terms of 
resources, the banks had abundant capital in state-owned commercial banks during the 
period of the 11th Five-Year Plan that could be used to support renewable energy 
developments. 
Local governments were active participants in and promoters of the wind energy market. 
They had a strong incentive to exchange resources for economic development. Their goal 
was to cultivate the local manufacturing industry and/or use local products by bringing in 
wind farm projects. In terms of resources, they had the power to make decisions about 
economic development, land use and project initiation, and the capacity to build a local 
financing platform. Therefore, local governments had both the interests and resources to 
participate actively in the development of the wind energy industry. 
Local governments also played a variety of roles in financing the PV industry. In the start-up 
period of PV enterprises, they allocated considerable resources to these enterprises and 
lowered their cost through preferential land prices and electricity rates; they were the venture 
capitalists in the PV manufacturers’ start-up period, the creditors when the enterprises were 
in urgent need of capital, the board members of the enterprises when they were founded or 
encountered financial difficulties (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2), and coordinators in helping 
enterprises secure capital from the stock market or bank loans (see Sections 5.1 and 5.6). 
The central government’s role was mainly reflected in 2009 and 2010 as it urged domestic 
commercial banks, led by the China Development Bank, to offer loans to the PV industry. 
Because of the participation of local governments in raising capital, the production capacities 
of the PV industry expanded exceptionally fast. It only took the Chinese PV industry ten 
years to become world-class. Although this development model – a rapid initial expansion of 
production capacity based on government financial support – seemed efficient in the short 
term, the industry was quickly hamstrung by its excess production capacity, which rendered 
this model problematic in the long run. 
For China’s wind energy investments, market demand played the most important role in the 
formation of coalitions. Central government drew up its policies based on a strategy of 
developing turbine manufacturing industry through domestic market demand, and indeed the 
expanding market demand bonded manufacturers, developers and local governments 
together. For the solar sector, the economic growth-based evaluation of local officials’ 
performance was the most important factor in the formation of coalitions. Driven by a desire 
for economic growth, local government and PV manufacturing companies formed alliances 
where the former became the spokesperson for the interests of the latter. Such relationships 
were so strong and firm that when one local official left his office, the successor still had the 
motivation to maintain it, even to the point where the local government would commit 
significant resources to save the PV manufacturing business when it encountered financial 
crisis. Driven by their pursuit of economic growth, a large number of municipalities developed 
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ambitious plans to build a local PV production base and made every effort to provide funding 
and other resources to encourage enterprises to expand their production capacity. But for 
some, overcapacity was a trap out of which they were unable to escape.20 
Coalitions in China’s wind and solar energy sector evolved with the development of the 
industries. For investment in wind energy, the geographical scope of the alliances continues 
to widen. With the expanding exports of wind turbines, banks provide strong financial support 
to wind turbine manufacturers. In terms of investment in solar PV companies, when they are 
hit by export recession, local government holds out its hands to assist them through 
bankruptcy and reorganisation, to inject capital, to coordinate with mergers and so on. As 
public criticism and oversight is getting stronger, the role of local government is also 
changing. These are topics worth paying attention to in future research on this type of 
coalition or alliance. 
  
                                               
20 Suntech went into a bankruptcy restructuring process in March 2013, and finished the re-organisation in late 2013. 
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Annex 
Table A.1 List of interviews 
No. Interviewee(s) Date 
1 Director of the National Centre for Climate Change Strategy and 
International Cooperation 
29 November 2013 
2 Wind turbine manufacturers 26 November 2013 
3 Local government officials from both Hebei province and Jiangsu 
province 
January 2012, July 2012 
4 Manager of Longyuan Power Group Corporation Limited 12 August 2013 
5 Officials from Energy Bureau in Jiangsu province 11 July 2012 
6 Local government officials from Baoding city, Hebei province 23 November 2013 
7 Official from Ministry of Commerce 10 December 2013 
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